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Economic analysis of law usually proceeds under the assumptions of neoclassical economics. But empirical evidence gives much reason to doubt these
assumptions; people exhibit bounded rationality, bounded self-interest, and
bounded willpower. This article offers a broad vision of how law and economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about actual
human behavior. It considers specific topics in the economic analysis of law
and proposes new models and approaches for addressing these topics. The
analysis of the article is organized into three categories: positive, prescriptive,
and normative. Positive analysis of law concerns how agents behave in response to legal rules and how legal rules are shaped. Prescriptive analysis
concerns what rules should be adopted to advance specified ends. Normative
analysis attempts to assess more broadly the ends of the legal system: Should
the system always respect people’s choices? By drawing attention to cognitive
and motivational problems of both citizens and government, behavioral law and
economics offers answers distinct from those offered by the standard analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Objections to the rational actor model in law and economics are almost
as old as the field itself. Early skeptics about the economic analysis of law
were quick to marshal arguments from psychology and other social sciences
to undermine its claims.1 But in law, challenges to the rational actor assumption by those who sympathize with the basic objectives of economic
analysis have been much less common. The absence of sustained and comprehensive economic analysis of legal rules from a perspective informed by
insights about actual human behavior makes for a significant contrast with
many other fields of economics, where such “behavioral” analysis has become relatively common.2 This is especially odd since law is a domain
where behavioral analysis would appear to be particularly promising in light
of the fact that nonmarket behavior is frequently involved.
Our goal in this article is to advance an approach to the economic analysis of law that is informed by a more accurate conception of choice, one that
reflects a better understanding of human behavior and its wellsprings. We
build on and attempt to generalize earlier work in law outlining behavioral
findings by taking the two logical next steps: proposing a systematic framework for a behavioral approach to economic analysis of law, and using behavioral insights to develop specific models and approaches addressing top-

1. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis
of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
2. See, e.g., volume 112, issue 2 of the Quarterly Journal of Economics, which contains 11
articles related to behavioral economics.
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ics of abiding interest in law and economics.3 The analysis of these specific
topics is preliminary and often in the nature of a proposal for a research
agenda; we touch on a wide range of issues in an effort to show the potential
uses of behavioral insights. The unifying idea in our analysis is that behavioral economics allows us to model and predict behavior relevant to law with
the tools of traditional economic analysis, but with more accurate assumptions about human behavior, and more accurate predictions and prescriptions
about law. Certainly a great deal of work would be necessary to justify a
final evaluation of most of the topics pursued here; there is fertile ground for
future research, both theoretical and empirical, and one of our principal goals
is to suggest the directions in which that research might go.
We suggest that an approach based on behavioral economics will help
with the three functions of any proposed approach to law: positive, prescriptive, and normative.4 The positive task, perhaps most central to economic
analysis of law and our principal emphasis here, is to explain both the effects
and content of law. How will law affect human behavior? What will individuals’ likely response to changes in the rules be? Why does law take the
form that it does? A superior understanding of human behavior will improve
answers to such questions.
The prescriptive task is to see how law might be used to achieve specified ends, such as deterring socially undesirable behavior. Much of conventional economic analysis is concerned with this sort of question. Explicit
consideration of behavioral factors can improve the prescriptions offered by
the analyst. For instance, instead of focusing only on the actual probability
of detecting criminal behavior in considering whether offenders will be deterred, the analyst might also want to consider the perceived probability of
detection and how it might differ in systematic and predictable ways from
the actual probability.
The normative task is to assess more broadly the ends of the legal system. In conventional economic analysis, normative analysis is no different
from prescriptive analysis, since the goal of the legal system is to maximize
3. The existing legal literature includes several articles that generally catalogue behavioral
findings and suggest legal issues to which these findings might be relevant. See Ward Edwards &
Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
225 (1986); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 211 (1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors:
A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein,
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997). The existing literature also includes a
number of articles that use behavioral insights to analyze specific topics in the economic analysis of
law—primarily the Coase theorem and behavior during bargaining. These articles are relevant to a
few of the issues we discuss below, and we will draw on them in analyzing those issues.
4. For a similar distinction between positive, prescriptive, and normative analysis, see David
E. Bell, Howard Raiffa & Amos Tversky, Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions in
Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING 9 (David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa & Amos Tversky eds.,
1988); Sunstein, supra note 3.
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“social welfare,” usually measured by people’s revealed preferences, and
prescriptive (in our sense of the term) analysis also focuses, for the conventional economist, on how to maximize social welfare. But from the perspective of behavioral economics, the ends of the legal system are more complex.
This is so because people’s revealed preferences are a less certain ground on
which to build; obviously issues of paternalism become central here.
Each of these three strands of our project is deeply constructive. Behavioral economics is a form of economics, and our goal is to strengthen the
predictive and analytic power of law and economics, not to undermine it.
Behavioral economics does not suggest that behavior is random or impossible to predict; rather it suggests, with economics, that behavior is systematic
and can be modeled. We attempt to sketch several such models here.
Part I below offers a general framework and provides an overview of the
arguments for enriching the traditional economic framework. We see this
enrichment as similar in spirit to the increased emphasis on asymmetric information in mainstream economic analysis in recent decades. Just as people
often have imperfect information, which has predictable consequences for
behavior, the departures from the standard conception of the economic agent
also alter behavior in predictable ways.
Parts II and III of the article involve positive analysis. Part II examines
how a behaviorally-informed law and economics analysis can help to explain
the behavior of human agents insofar as that behavior is relevant to law. Our
topics here include bargaining behavior and the effects of mandatory contract
terms. Part III shifts to an explanation of existing legal rules and institutions.
We suggest that many features of the legal landscape that are puzzling from a
traditional law and economics perspective follow naturally from behavioral
phenomena.
Part IV of the article examines prescriptive issues, offering a series of
proposals that might seem surprising or controversial from a neoclassical
economic perspective but that follow naturally from taking into account features of actual choice behavior. Our principal emphasis is on how people
respond to information and how this point bears on the role of law.
Part V is more speculative and normative. We briefly outline the main
problems—some familiar and others less so—with the idea that the legal
system ought always to respect informed choice, and also with the idea that
government decisionmakers—who after all are behavioral actors too—can be
relied upon to make better choices than citizens. Because of the complexity
of these issues, we emphasize three broad points: the framework that behavioral economics suggests for thinking about issues of paternalism; the
possibility that some institutions—such as populist government—may be
particularly bad at attempted correction of citizen error, while others may be
better; and the prospect that some methods of correction (such as those that
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focus on debiasing rather than outright coercion) may be acceptable even if
one thinks that citizen error is relatively unlikely.
I. FOUNDATIONS: WHAT IS “BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS”?
In order to identify, in a general way, the defining features of behavioral
law and economics, it is useful first to understand the defining features of
law and economics. As we understand it, this approach to the law posits that
legal rules are best analyzed and understood in light of standard economic
principles. Gary Becker offers a typical account of those principles: “[A]ll
human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1] maximize
their utility [2] from a stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.”5 The
task of law and economics is to determine the implications of such rational
maximizing behavior in and out of markets, and its legal implications for
markets and other institutions. Although some of Becker’s particular applications of the economic approach might be thought of as contentious, that
general approach underlies a wide range of work in the economic analysis of
law.6
What then is the task of behavioral law and economics? How does it differ from standard law and economics? These are the questions we address
below.
A. Homo Economicus and Real People
The task of behavioral law and economics, simply stated, is to explore
the implications of actual (not hypothesized) human behavior for the law.
How do “real people” differ from homo economicus? We will describe the
differences by stressing three important “bounds” on human behavior,
bounds that draw into question the central ideas of utility maximization, stable preferences, rational expectations, and optimal processing of information.7 People can be said to display bounded rationality, bounded willpower,
and bounded self-interest.
All three bounds are well documented in the literature of other social sciences, but they are relatively unexplored in economics (although, as we
noted at the outset, this has begun to change). Each of these bounds represents a significant way in which most people depart from the standard eco5. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976).
6. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10 (2d
ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (5th ed. 1998).
7. For a further elaboration of this view, see Richard H. Thaler, Doing Economics Without
Homo Economicus, in FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS: HOW DO ECONOMISTS DO
ECONOMICS? 227, 230-35 (Steven G. Medema & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1996).
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nomic model. While there are instances in which more than one bound
comes into play, at this stage we think it is best to conceive of them as separate modeling problems. Nonetheless, each of the three bounds points to
systematic (rather than random or arbitrary) departures from conventional
economic models, and thus each of the three bears on generating sound predictions and prescriptions for law. They also provide the foundations for
new and sometimes quite formal models of behavior.
1. Bounded rationality.
Bounded rationality, an idea first introduced by Herbert Simon, refers to
the obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not infinite.8 We have
limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories. People can respond sensibly to these failings; thus it might be said that people sometimes
respond rationally to their own cognitive limitations, minimizing the sum of
decision costs and error costs. To deal with limited memories we make lists.
To deal with limited brain power and time we use mental shortcuts and rules
of thumb. But even with these remedies, and in some cases because of these
remedies, human behavior differs in systematic ways from that predicted by
the standard economic model of unbounded rationality. Even when the use
of mental shortcuts is rational, it can produce predictable mistakes. The departures from the standard model can be divided into two categories: judgment and decisionmaking. Actual judgments show systematic departures
from models of unbiased forecasts, and actual decisions often violate the
axioms of expected utility theory.
A major source of differences between actual judgments and unbiased
forecasts is the use of rules of thumb. As stressed in the pathbreaking work
of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, rules of thumb such as the availability heuristic—in which the frequency of some event is estimated by
judging how easy it is to recall other instances of this type (how “available”
such instances are)—lead us to erroneous conclusions. People tend to conclude, for example, that the probability of an event (such as a car accident) is
greater if they have recently witnessed an occurrence of that event than if
they have not.9 What is especially important in the work of Kahneman and
Tversky is that it shows that shortcuts and rules of thumb are predictable.
While the heuristics are useful on average (which explains how they become
adopted), they lead to errors in particular circumstances. This means that
someone using such a rule of thumb may be behaving rationally in the sense
of economizing on thinking time, but such a person will nonetheless make
8. Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
9. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds.,
1982).
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forecasts that are different from those that emerge from the standard rationalchoice model.10
Just as unbiased forecasting is not a good description of actual human
behavior, expected utility theory is not a good description of actual decisionmaking. While the axioms of expected utility theory characterize rational choice, actual choices diverge in important ways from this model, as
has been known since the early experiments by Allais and Ellsberg.11 There
has been an explosion of research in recent years trying to develop better
formal models of actual decisionmaking. The model offered by Kahneman
and Tversky, called prospect theory, seems to do a good job of explaining
many features of observed behavior, and so we draw on that model (whose
main features we summarize in Part IV.B below) here.12
We emphasize that bounded rationality is entirely consistent with modeling behavior and generating predictions based on a model, in line with the
methodology of conventional economics. As Kenneth Arrow has explained,
“[T]here is no general principle that prevents the creation of an economic
theory based on other hypotheses than that of rationality. . . . [A]ny coherent
theory of reactions to the stimuli appropriate in an economic
context . . . could in principle lead to a theory of the economy.”13 Arrow’s
example here is habit formation; that behavior, he says, can be incorporated
into a theory by supposing that people choose goods with an eye towards
minimizing changes in their consumption.
Though there is an optimization in this theory, it is different from utility maximization; for example, if prices and income return to their initial levels after
several alterations, the final bundle [of goods] purchased will not be the same as
the initial [bundle]. This theory would strike many lay observers as plausible,
yet it is not rational as economists have used that term.14

10. For further discussion, see the recent survey of results in John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669, 671, 682-83 (1996).
11. See Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS 587, 619-20, 622-24 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (describing the Allais
paradox); Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643 (1961).
12. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). For a survey of empirical tests of this and other models, see
Camerer, supra note 11, at 626-43. John D. Hey & Chris Orme, Investigating Generalizations of
Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data, 62 ECONOMETRICA 1291 (1994), conclude that
expected utility theory performs fairly well, but they do not consider prospect theory as an alternative. An alternative to prospect theory for modifying expected utility theory is offered by Itzhak
Gilboa & David Schmeidler, Case-Based Decision Theory, 110 Q.J. ECON. 605 (1995).
13. Kenneth J. Arrow, Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System, in RATIONAL
CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 201, 202 (Robin M. Hogarth &
Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987).
14. Id.
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2. Bounded willpower.
In addition to bounded rationality, people often display bounded willpower. This term refers to the fact that human beings often take actions that
they know to be in conflict with their own long-term interests. Most smokers
say they would prefer not to smoke, and many pay money to join a program
or obtain a drug that will help them quit. As with bounded rationality, many
people recognize that they have bounded willpower and take steps to mitigate its effects. They join a pension plan or “Christmas Club” (a special
savings arrangement under which funds can be withdrawn only around the
holidays) to prevent undersaving, and they don’t keep tempting desserts
around the house when trying to diet. In some cases they may vote for or
support governmental policies, such as social security, to eliminate any
temptation to succumb to the desire for immediate rewards.15 Thus, the demand for and supply of law may reflect people’s understanding of their own
(or others’) bounded willpower; consider “cooling off” periods for certain
sales and programs that facilitate or even require saving.
3. Bounded self-interest.
Finally, we use the term bounded self-interest to refer to an important
fact about the utility function of most people: They care, or act as if they
care, about others, even strangers, in some circumstances. (Thus, we are not
questioning here the idea of utility maximization, but rather the common assumptions about what that entails.) Our notion is distinct from simple altruism, which conventional economics has emphasized in areas such as bequest
decisions.16 Self-interest is bounded in a much broader range of settings than
conventional economics assumes, and the bound operates in ways different
from what the conventional understanding suggests. In many market and
bargaining settings (as opposed to nonmarket settings such as bequest decisions), people care about being treated fairly and want to treat others fairly if
those others are themselves behaving fairly. As a result of these concerns,
the agents in a behavioral economic model are both nicer and (when they are
not treated fairly) more spiteful than the agents postulated by neoclassical
theory. Formal models have been used to show how people deal with both
fairness and unfairness; we will draw on those models here.

15. See Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991).
16. See B. Douglas Bernheim, How Strong Are Bequest Motives? Evidence Based on Estimates of the Demand for Life Insurance and Annuities, 99 J. POL. ECON. 899, 899-900 (1991).
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4. Applications.
The goal of this article is to show how the incorporation of these understandings of human behavior bears on the actual operation and possible improvement of the legal system. The appendix summarizes some key features
of each of the three bounds on human behavior just described. It also indicates the law and economics issues we analyze under each category.
When is each bound likely to come into play? Any general statement
will necessarily be incomplete, but some broad generalizations can be offered. First, bounded rationality as it relates to judgment behavior will come
into play whenever actors in the legal system are called upon to assess the
probability of an uncertain event. We discuss many examples below, including environmental legislation (Part III.C), negligence determinations
(Part IV.A), and risk assessments (Parts IV.B and V.A.). Second, bounded
rationality as it relates to decisionmaking behavior will come into play
whenever actors are valuing outcomes; a prominent example here is loss
aversion and its corollary, the endowment effect, which we discuss in connection with bargaining behavior (Part II.B), mandatory contract terms (Part
II.D), prior restraints on speech (Part III.B), and risk assessments (Part IV.B).
Bounded willpower is most relevant when decisions have consequences over
time; our example is criminal behavior (Part IV.C), where the benefits are
generally immediate and the costs deferred. Finally, bounded self-interest
(as we use the term) is relevant primarily in situations in which one party has
deviated substantially from the usual or ordinary conduct under the circumstances; in such circumstances the other party will often be willing to incur
financial costs to punish the “unfair” behavior. Our applications here include
bargaining behavior (Part II.B) and laws banning market transactions (Part
III.A).
The three bounds we describe do not (at least as we characterize them
here) constitute a full description of human behavior in all its complexity.
Although we will have more to say about parsimony below, we will say for
now that our goal is to sketch out an approach spare enough to generate predictions across a range of contexts, but not so spare that its predictions about
behavior are often incorrect (as we will suggest is the case with conventional
law and economics in some contexts). Many interesting features of behavior
discussed by psychologists but not emphasized by our framework may also
play a role in explaining specific forms of behavior relevant to law.17 And it
can be illuminating to attend in some detail to the role of social norms in
17. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994) (finding effects of “equity seeking” and “reactive devaluation” on settlement behavior); Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich &
Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1996)
(describing effects of “compromise” and “contrast” behavior on jury decisionmaking).
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various contexts18 and to the place of shame, pride, and status,19 especially
insofar as an understanding of these variables helps give content to people’s
utility functions in ways that bear on the uses of law. Our principal purpose
here, however, is to provide predictions, rather than to give full descriptions
of individual motivations and self-understandings, and we will refer to these
variables only occasionally and in passing. For similar reasons, we do not
emphasize behavioral patterns that depart from standard economic assumptions but fail to point in systematic directions; such patterns would not generate distinct predictions (although they would of course matter to a full account of individual behavior). Our focus here is robust, empirically documented phenomena that have reasonably precise implications for legal issues.
B. Testable Predictions
Behavioral and conventional law and economics do not differ solely in
their assumptions about human behavior. They also differ, in testable ways,
in their predictions about how law (as well as other forces) affects behavior.
To make these differences more concrete, consider the three “fundamental
principles of economics” set forth by Richard Posner in his Economic Analysis of Law,20 in a discussion that is, on these points, quite conventional.
(Posner’s discussion represents an application of the basic economic methodology set forth by Becker above.21) To what extent would an account
based on behavioral law and economics offer different “fundamental principles”?
The first fundamental principle for the conventional approach is downward-sloping demand: Total demand for a good falls when its price rises.22
This prediction is, of course, valid. There are few if any documented cases
of Giffen goods (goods that are consumed more heavily at high prices, due to
the fact that the price increase makes people unable to afford goods that are
even pricier than the good in question). However, confirmation of the prediction of downward-sloping demand does not suggest that people are optimizing. As Becker has shown, even people choosing at random (rather than
in a way designed to serve their preferences) will tend to consume less of a
good when its price goes up as long as they have limited resources.23 This
18. See Symposium, Law, Economics & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996).
19. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995);
Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992). McAdams’ work draws on
ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND (1985).
20. POSNER, supra note 6, at 4.
21. See id. at 3.
22. See id.
23. Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4-6
(1962).
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behavior has also been demonstrated with laboratory rats.24 Thus, evidence
of downward-sloping demand is not evidence in support of optimizing models.
The second fundamental principle of conventional law and economics
concerns the nature of costs: “Cost to the economist is ‘opportunity cost,’”
and “‘[s]unk’ (incurred) costs do not affect decisions on prices and quantity.”25 Thus, according to traditional analysis, decisionmakers will equate
opportunity costs (which are costs incurred by foregoing opportunities—say,
the opportunity to sell one’s possessions) to out-of-pocket costs (such as
costs incurred in buying possessions); and they will ignore sunk costs (costs
that cannot be recovered, such as the cost of nonrefundable tickets). But
each of these propositions is a frequent source of predictive failures. The
equality of opportunity costs and out-of-pocket costs implies that, in the absence of important wealth effects, buying prices will be roughly equal to
selling prices. This is frequently violated, as is well known. Many people
holding tickets to a popular sporting event such as the Super Bowl would be
unwilling to buy tickets at the market price (say $1000), yet would also be
unwilling to sell at this price. Indeed, estimates of the ratio of selling prices
to buying prices are often at least two to one, yet the size of the transaction
makes it implausible in these studies to conclude that wealth effects explain
the difference.26 As described below, these results are just what behavioral
analysis suggests.
The traditional assumption about sunk costs also generates invalid predictions. Here is one: A theater patron who ignores sunk costs would not
take into account the cost of a prepaid season pass in deciding whether to
“rou[se] [him]self . . . to go out” on the evening of a particular performance;27 the decision would be made purely on the basis of the benefits and
costs from that moment forward. However, in a study of theater patrons,
some of whom were randomly assigned to receive discounted prices on prepaid passes, the patrons who received discounts were found to attend significantly fewer performances than those who did not receive discounts, despite
the fact that (due to random assignment) the benefit-cost ratio that should
have mattered—benefits and costs going forward—was the same on average

24. JOHN H. KAGEL, RAYMOND C. BATTALIO & LEONARD GREEN, ECONOMIC CHOICE
THEORY: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 8, 17-19, 24-25 (1995).
25. POSNER, supra note 6, at 6, 7.
26. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1327 tbl.1 (1990) (summarizing
studies).
27. ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 22 (1993).
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in the two groups.28 In short, sunk costs mattered; again, the standard prediction proved invalid.
The third fundamental principle of conventional law and economics is
that “resources tend to gravitate toward their most valuable uses” as markets
drive out any unexploited profit opportunities.29 When combined with the
notion that opportunity and out-of-pocket costs are equated (see fundamental
principle two), this yields the Coase theorem—the idea that initial assignments of entitlements will not affect the ultimate allocation of resources so
long as transaction costs are zero.30 Many economists and economically oriented lawyers think of the Coase theorem as a tautology; if there were really
no transaction costs (and no wealth effects), and if an alternative allocation
of resources would make some agents better off and none worse off, then of
course the agents would move to that allocation. Careful empirical study,
however, shows that the Coase theorem is not a tautology; indeed, it can lead
to inaccurate predictions.31 That is, even when transaction costs and wealth
effects are known to be zero, initial entitlements alter the final allocation of
resources. These results are predicted by behavioral economics, which emphasizes the difference between opportunity and out-of-pocket costs.
Consider the following set of experiments conducted to test the Coase
theorem;32 let us offer an interpretation geared to the particular context of
economic analysis of law. The subjects were forty-four students taking an
advanced undergraduate course in law and economics at Cornell University.
Half the students were endowed with tokens. Each student (whether or not
endowed with a token) was assigned a personal token value, the price at
which a token could be redeemed for cash at the end of the experiment; these
assigned values induce supply and demand curves for the tokens. Markets
were conducted for tokens. Those without tokens could buy one, while those
with tokens could sell. Those with tokens should (and do) sell their tokens if
offered more than their assigned value; those without tokens should (and do)
buy tokens if they can get one at a price below their assigned value. These
token markets are a complete victory of economic theory. The equilibrium
price was always exactly what the theory would predict, and the tokens did
in fact flow to those who valued them most.
However, life is generally not about tokens redeemable for cash. Thus
another experiment was conducted, identical to the first except that now half
the students were given Cornell coffee mugs instead of tokens. Here behavioral analysis generates a prediction distinct from standard economic analy28. Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 127-28 (1985).
29. POSNER, supra note 6, at 11.
30. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
31. See Kahneman et al., supra note 26, at 1329-42.
32. See id.
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sis: Because people do not equate opportunity and out-of-pocket costs for
goods whose values are not solely exogenously defined (as they were in the
case of the tokens), those endowed with mugs should be reluctant to part
with them even at prices they would not have considered paying to acquire a
mug had they not received one.
Was this prediction correct? Yes. Markets were conducted and mugs
bought and sold. Unlike the case of the tokens, the assignment of property
rights had a pronounced effect on the final allocation of mugs. The students
who were assigned mugs had a strong tendency to keep them. Whereas the
Coase theorem would have predicted that about half the mugs would trade
(since transaction costs had been shown to be essentially zero in the token
experiments, and mugs were randomly distributed), instead only fifteen percent of the mugs traded. And those who were endowed with mugs asked
more than twice as much to give up a mug as those who didn’t get a mug
were willing to pay. This result did not change if the markets were repeated.
This effect is generally referred to as the “endowment effect”; it is a manifestation of the broader phenomenon of “loss aversion”—the idea that losses
are weighted more heavily than gains—which in turn is a central building
block of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory.
What are we to make of these findings? There are at least three important lessons. First, markets are indeed robust institutions. Even naive subjects participating at low stakes produce outcomes indistinguishable from
those predicted by the theory when trading for tokens. Second, when agents
must determine their own values (as with the mugs), outcomes can diverge
substantially from those predicted by economic theory. Third, these departures will not be obvious outside an experiment, even when they exist and
have considerable importance. That is, even in the mugs markets, there was
trading; there was just not as much trading as the theory would predict.
These lessons can be applied to other markets; we offer some examples below.
The foregoing discussion illustrates the point with which we began this
section: The difference between conventional and behavioral law and economics is not just a difference in the validity of the assumptions about human
behavior. While the assumptions of unbounded rationality, willpower, and
self-interest are unrealistic, the force of behavioral economics comes from
the difference in its predictions (for example, fewer trades for mugs than for
tokens). In this sense, our analysis is consistent with the precept originally
proposed by Milton Friedman: Economics should not be judged on whether
the assumptions are realistic or valid, but rather on the quality of its predictions.33 We share this view (or at least will accept it for purposes of this arti33. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3, 14-16 (1953).
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cle); as we have emphasized, our principal interest is predictive in character.
A behavioral analysis would be of much less interest if conventional economic models did a satisfactory job of predicting the behavior of agents insofar as relevant to law. Unfortunately, they often do not.
C. Partial and Ambiguous Successes of Conventional Economics
What of all the well-known successes of conventional economics? Do
they show that predictions about law based on the conventional assumptions
tend to work? Consider some examples of the successes: (1) the inverse
correlation between price ceilings and queues; (2) the inverse correlation
between rent control and the stock of housing; (3) the positive correlation in
financial markets between risk and expected return; (4) the relation between
futures prices and spot-market prices.34 The problem with the first three examples is that, as with tests of downward-sloping demand curves, they are
quite undemanding; they ask simply whether the theory gets the direction of
the effect right—and it does. But this is not a complete vindication of the
theory, for the theory may misstate the magnitude of the effect. Consider
(3), the positive relation between risk and return in financial markets. As
predicted by this theory, stocks (equities) earn higher returns (on average)
than do riskless assets such as treasury bills. But what can we say about the
magnitude? Is this difference in return roughly what the theory would predict? This is precisely the question posed by Rajnish Mehra and Edward
Prescott in their well-known paper on the “equity premium puzzle.”35 The
equity premium is the difference in returns between equities and riskless assets. In the United States, the equity premium has been roughly six percent
per year over the past seventy years.36 This implies that a dollar invested in
stocks in 1926 would, at the end of 1997, be worth over $1800, while a dollar invested in treasury bills would have accumulated to less than $15. This
difference is remarkably large. Mehra and Prescott therefore ask whether it
can possibly be explained by investor risk aversion. They conclude that it
cannot. That is, no plausible value of risk aversion could explain such a big
difference.37 Although the theory gets the sign right in this case, the magnitude of the effect suggests that the theory is wrong. (And note that arbitrage,
which we discuss just below, would not be expected to eliminate the equity
premium; there are often significant costs of arbitrage in equity markets.38)
34. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 18.
35. Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium: A Puzzle, 15 J. MONETARY
ECON. 145 (1985).
36. See IBBOTSON ASSOCIATES, STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS AND INFLATION: 1997 YEARBOOK.
37. See Jeremy J. Siegel & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Equity Premium Puzzle, 11 J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 1997, at 191, 192, for a discussion.
38. See Jeffrey Pontiff, Costly Arbitrage: Evidence from Closed-End Funds, 111 Q.J. ECON.
1135 (1996); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 (1997).
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Example (4) above, the relation between spot and futures prices, does
better on magnitudes. Spot and futures prices are very closely related. However, this case is special in several respects. First, arbitrage is possible. If
spot and futures prices get out of line, then investors can make sure profits by
buying the contract that is too cheap and selling the one that is too expensive.
Second, this context is one in which most of the activity is undertaken by
professionals who will quickly lose their money and their jobs if they make
frequent errors. Third, the markets in which these professionals operate offer
frequent opportunities for learning. Under these circumstances, markets tend
to work very well,39 though not perfectly.40 Essentially, these conditions
render agents who do not conform to the standard economic assumptions
irrelevant (because they will be bankrupt).
So, in some (fairly unusual) circumstances, such as futures trading, market forces are strong enough to make the three “bounds” irrelevant for predictive purposes. The point is important; it suggests that while human beings
often display bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest, markets can
sometimes lead to behavior consistent with conventional economic assumptions. Then the question becomes when, exactly, do market forces make it
reasonable to assume that people behave in accordance with those assumptions? What circumstances apply to most of the domains in which law and
economics is used?
In this regard it is instructive to compare the market for futures contracts
with the market for criminal activity. Consider the proposition that a potential criminal will commit some crime if the expected gains from the crime
exceed its expected costs.41 Suppose a criminal mistakenly thinks that the
expected gains outweigh the expected costs, when in fact the opposite is true.
First notice that no arbitrage will be possible in this situation. If someone is
unfortunate enough to commit a crime with a negative expected value, then
there is no way for anyone else to profit directly from his behavior. Outside
of financial markets (and not always there), those who engage in low-payoff
activities lose utility but do not create profit opportunities for others. Nor do
they typically disappear from the market. (Even poorly run firms can survive
for many years; consider GM.) Being a bad criminal is rarely fatal, and except possibly for organized crime, there is little opportunity for “hostile takeovers.” Finally, the decision to enter a life of crime is not one that is made
39. See Thomas Russell & Richard H. Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive Markets, in RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 239, 248-49 (1991).
40. For example, in a rational market, the relation between spot and futures contracts for foreign exchange are good forecasts of movements in exchange rates. In fact, these forecasts are systematically biased. See Kenneth A. Froot & Richard H. Thaler, Foreign Exchange, in RICHARD H.
THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 182, 185-86
(1992).
41. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions
as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1235 (1985).

May 1998]

BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO LAW & ECONOMICS

1487

repeatedly with many opportunities to learn. Once a teenager has dropped
out of high school to become a drug dealer, it is difficult to switch to dentistry.
Because law and economics is frequently applied to criminal behavior,
the above argument is obviously germane. We think that the same analysis
applies to many of the domains in which law and economics has been used.
In fact, economic analysis of law seems to be a branch of economics in
which the limits of arbitrage are particularly powerful, so special care should
be taken not to push the standard economic model too far.
This is by no means to say that conventional law and economics has had
no victories. One cannot look at the current state of antitrust law, or the use
of market-based regulation in environmental law (to name just two of many
examples), without acknowledging the important advances produced through
the conventional approach. Often this approach points in the right direction
and identifies flaws in noneconomic reasoning. Many advances in the positive and prescriptive understanding of law have come from the conventional
assumptions. Attention to incentive effects can often reveal a great deal.
(Thus, those who would argue that rent control helps tenants must contend
with the obvious long-run supply effects of such laws.)
The project of behavioral law and economics, as we see it, is to take the
core insights and successes of economics and build upon them by making
more realistic assumptions about human behavior. We wish to retain the
power of the economist’s approach to social science while offering a better
description of the behavior of the agents in society and the economy. Behavioral law and economics, in short, offers the potential to be law and economics with a higher “R2”—that is, greater power to explain the observed
data. We will try to highlight some of that potential (and suggest cases
where it has been realized) in this article.
D. Parsimony
A possible objection to our approach is that conventional economics has
the advantage of simplicity and parsimony. At least—the objection goes—it
provides a theory. By contrast, a behavioral perspective offers a more complicated and unruly picture of human behavior, and perhaps that picture will
make prediction more difficult, precisely because behavior is more complicated and unruly. Everything can be explained in an ex post fashion—some
tool will be found that is up to the task—but the elegance, generalizability,
and predictive power of the economic method will be lost. Shouldn’t analysts proceed with simple tools? We offer two responses: First, simplicity
and parsimony are indeed beneficial; it would be highly desirable to come up
with a model of behavior that is both simple and right. But conventional
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economics is not in this position, for its predictions are often wrong. We will
encounter many examples in addition to those already discussed.
Second, to the extent that conventional economics achieves parsimony, it
often does so at the expense of any real predictive power. Its goal is to provide a unitary theory of behavior, a goal which may be impossible to
achieve. By itself the notion of “rationality” (the centerpiece of traditional
analysis) is not a theory; to generate predictions it must be more fully specified, often through the use of auxiliary assumptions.42 Indeed, the term “rationality” is highly ambiguous and can be used to mean many things. A person might be deemed rational if her behavior (1) conforms to the axioms of
expected utility theory; (2) is responsive to incentives, that is, if the actor
changes her behavior when the costs and benefits are altered; (3) is internally
consistent; (4) promotes her own welfare; or (5) is effective in achieving her
goals, whatever the relationship between those goals and her actual welfare.
We observe departures from most of these definitions; thus, with respect to
(1), scholars have documented departures from expected utility theory for
nearly fifty years, and prospect theory seems to predict behavior better.43
With respect to (4) and (5), people’s decisions sometimes do not promote
their welfare or help them to achieve their own goals; and with respect to (3),
behavioral research shows that people sometimes behave in an inconsistent
manner by, for example, indicating a preference for X over Y if asked to
make a direct choice, but Y over X if asked to give their willingness to pay
for each option.44 Many of our examples will thus show that people are frequently not rational if the term is understood to mean (1), (3), (4), or (5). As
for (2), without some specification of what counts as a cost and a benefit, the
idea of responsiveness to incentives is empty. If rationality is used to mean
simply that people “choose” what they “prefer” in light of the prevailing incentives,45 then the notion of rationality offers few restrictions on behavior.
The person who drinks castor oil as often as possible is rational because she
happens to love castor oil. Other self-destructive behavior (drug addiction,
suicide, etc.) can be explained on similar grounds. It is not even clear on this
view whether rationality is intended as a definition of “preference” or as a
prediction.46
42. See Arrow, supra note 13, at 205-06.
43. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
44. Amos Tversky, Rational Theory and Constructive Choice, in THE RATIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 185, 189-91 (Kenneth J. Arrow, Enrico Colombatto,
Mark Perlman & Christian Schmidt eds., 1996).
45. See, e.g., TOMAS J. PHILLIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC
HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4 (1995).
46. Thus the idea is ambiguous between the notion of “revealed preferences,” in which
choices define preferences, and the notion of a maximization function that lies behind and helps
explain choices. Both notions raise many difficult issues. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and
Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 931-38 (1996).
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If such a notion of rationality allowed for good predictions, then perhaps
there would be no reason for complaint; the problem, however, is that so
high a degree of flexibility leaves the theory with few a priori restrictions. A
theory with infinite degrees of freedom is no theory at all. For example, consider whether it is a paradox (as many economists think) that so many people
vote (despite the virtual certainty that no one person’s vote will alter the outcome). If it is a paradox, so much the worse for the rationality assumption; if
it is not a paradox, what does the assumption predict? Does it merely predict
that people will respond to changes in conditions—for example, fewer people will vote when it is snowing? If so, the prediction is not bad, but surely it
would be possible to say, after an unusually large vote amidst the storm, that
more people voted simply because voting seemed especially valiant in those
circumstances (so much for predictions based on this form of rationality).
Conventional economics sometimes turns to stronger forms of rationality in
response, and those forms provide stronger predictions in some cases; but
those predictions are often inaccurate, as described above and as illustrated
by the examples considered below.
We believe that a behavioral approach imposes discipline on economic
theorizing because assumptions cannot be imported at will. In a behavioral
approach, assumptions about behavior should accord with empirically validated descriptions of actual behavior. For example, in the case of “fairness,”
specifically defined and empirically verified patterns of behavior are used to
generate predictions in new contexts. (“Fairness” is not, on this view, simply
a catch-all to explain any observed behavior.) This is the approach we advocate for economic analysis of law. This approach, we believe, produces a
better understanding of law and a better set of predictions about its effects.
We now turn to positive, prescriptive, and normative issues. Our purpose is not to settle all of them, but to show the promise of behavioral economics in casting light on a wide range of questions. A great deal of work
would be necessary to justify authoritative judgments on most of these questions. What follows should be taken partly as a proposal, perhaps in the
spirit of the early economic analysis of law, for a research agenda to be carried out with a new set of tools.
II. BEHAVIOR OF AGENTS
A. The Ultimatum Game
1. The game and its sunk-cost variation.
We begin with bounded self-interest, the third bound described above. A
useful first example of this bound is agents’ behavior in a very simple bargaining game called the ultimatum game. In this game, one player, the Pro-
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poser, is asked to propose an allocation of a sum of money between herself
and the other player, the Responder. The Responder then has a choice. He
can either accept the amount offered to him by the Proposer, leaving the rest
to the Proposer, or he can reject the offer, in which case both players get
nothing. Neither player knows the identity of his or her counterpart, and the
players will play against each other only once, so reputations and future retaliation are eliminated as factors.
Economic theory has a simple prediction about this game. The Proposer
will offer the smallest unit of currency available, say a penny, and the Responder will accept, since a penny is better than nothing. This turns out to be
a very bad prediction about how the game is actually played. Responders
typically reject offers of less than twenty percent of the total amount available; the average minimum amount that Responders say they would accept is
between twenty and thirty percent of that sum.47 Responders are thus willing
to punish unfair behavior, even at a financial cost to themselves. This is a
form of bounded self-interest. And this response seems to be expected and
anticipated by Proposers; they typically offer a substantial portion of the sum
to be divided—ordinarily forty to fifty percent.48
Economists often worry that the results of this type of experiment are
sensitive to the way in which the experiment was conducted. What would
happen if the stakes were raised substantially, or the game was repeated several times to allow learning? In this case, we know the answer. To a first
approximation, neither of these factors changes the results in any important
way. Raising the stakes from $10 per pair to $100, or even to more than a
week’s income (in a poor country) has little effect; the same is true of repeating the game ten times with different partners.49 (Of course, at some
point raising the stakes would matter; probably few people would turn down
an offer of five percent of $1,000,000.) We do not see behavior moving toward the prediction of standard economic theory.
Thus, the factors that many economists thought would change the outcome of the game did not. But, as we learned in a study conducted for this
47. See Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of
Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 371-72, 375 tbls.4 & 5 (1982); Daniel
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59
J. BUS. S285, S291 tbl.2 (1986).
48. See Güth et al., supra note 47, at 371-72, 375 tbls.4 & 5; Kahneman et al., supra note 47,
at S291 tbl.2.
49. See Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators, and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 209, 210-11; Vesna Prasnikar & Alvin E. Roth, Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games, 107 Q.J. ECON. 865,
873-75 (1992); Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An
Experiment in the Slovak Republic, 66 ECONOMETRICA 569, 573 (1998). When repetition is combined with very high stakes, however, offers decrease somewhat, although they are still far above
what the standard analysis would predict. See Slonim & Roth, supra, at 573, 588 fig.3A.
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article, a factor that economic theory predicts will not have an effect, namely
the introduction of a sunk cost, does have an effect. As noted above, economics predicts that decisionmakers will ignore sunk costs in making their
choices (see fundamental principle two above); but in fact decisionmakers
often do not behave in this way. Do sunk costs alter behavior in the ultimatum game? To find out, we asked classroom volunteers to bring $5—what
would become a sunk cost for them—to class. Students were given a form
asking them how they would play both roles in an ultimatum game in which
the $10 to be divided was contributed half by the Proposer and half by the
Responder. They were told that their role would be determined by chance,
so they had to decide first what offer to make if they were chosen to be a
Proposer and then what minimum offer they would be willing to accept if
they were a Responder.50 We also ran a version of the standard ultimatum
game (without sunk costs by the students) as a control.
Although economic theory says that the sunk-cost variation of the ultimatum game will have no effect on behavior (since the $5 collected from
each student is a sunk cost and should therefore be ignored by the players),
we predicted that in this domain sunk costs would matter. In particular, we
anticipated that Responders would feel that they had an “entitlement” to the
$5 they had contributed to the experiment and would therefore be reluctant to
accept less. This is precisely what we found. In the original version of the
game, when the $10 to be divided was provided to subjects by the experimenter, the average minimum amount demanded by Responders was $1.94.
In the sunk-cost version, where the students each paid $5 to participate, the
average demand was $3.21 for a group of MIT MBA students, $3.73 for a
group of University of Chicago (UC) MBA students, and $3.35 for a group
of UC Law students. Each of these means is significantly different from the
control value of $1.94 under any conventional measure of statistical significance. Looking past means, 61% of the MIT students demanded at least
$4.00, and 32% demanded a full refund of their $5.00. For UC MBA students, 67% demanded at least $4.00, and 40% demanded $5.00. The UC
Law students were slightly less extreme: 47% demanded at least $4.00, and
23% demanded $5.00.

50. This experiment is profitable for the experimenter if any offers are rejected by Responders
(because the experimenter has collected $10 from each pair of bargainers, which the bargainers
forfeit if the Proposer’s offer is rejected). To solve this “problem,” we conducted another experiment right after in which the winner of a game was awarded any profits earned by the experimenter
in the first round.
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ULTIMATUM GAME RESULTS

MIT MBA

Average
Demand
$3.21

Percent
Demanding $4.00
61%

Percent
Demanding $5.00
32%

UC MBA

$3.73

67%

40%

UC Law

$3.35

47%

23%

Note that our emphasis here, as well as in the ordinary ultimatum game,
is on the fairness behavior of Responders, not on affirmative concerns for
fairness on the part of Proposers. (As noted above, their behavior appears
fully consistent with financially maximizing responses to Responders’ fairness behavior; other experimental results support this conclusion.51) We do
know, however, that in other contexts people appear to display affirmative
concerns for fairness.52
The fairness results obtained in various experimental settings, such as the
ultimatum game, cannot be explained on grounds of reputation. The parties
are interacting anonymously and in a one-shot fashion. Of course, many
real-world situations may reflect a combination of reputational and fairness
factors. Thus, for example, firms that violate the norms of an industry are
ostracized, presumably at some cost to the remaining firms, partly because of
a rational fear that the offending party might be untrustworthy, and partly
because of a spiteful tendency to punish unmannerly behavior, even when
the punishment is costly to administer (as when Responders turn down small
offers). Many of Robert Ellickson’s examples in his pathbreaking book, Order Without Law, have precisely this flavor.53 Often it is impossible to disentangle the two effects. The value of the experimental method is precisely
that situations can be created in which the reputational factor is absent (because the transactions are anonymous and one-shot), allowing one to test directly for fairness. The ultimatum game results show that we find it: People
will often behave in accordance with fairness considerations even when it is
against their financial self-interest and no one will know. Thus, for instance,

51. See Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe & Vernon L. Smith, Social Distance and OtherRegarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653, 653-54 & fig.1 (1996) (finding
that Proposers typically offered no more than 10% of the sum to be divided—and over 60% offered
nothing—when (1) the Responder had no choice but to accept the Proposer’s offer and (2) anonymity was guaranteed).
52. See Ernst Fehr, Georg Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl, Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing: An Experimental Investigation, 108 Q.J. ECON. 437 (1993).
53. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
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most people leave tips in out-of-town restaurants that they never plan to visit
again.
2. Fairness, acrimony, and scruples.
Theoretical considerations. How can economic analysis be enriched to
incorporate the behavior observed in the ultimatum game and its sunk-cost
variant? As we have indicated, the first step is to relax the assumption,
common to most economic theorizing, of “unbounded self-interest.” This
assumption implies that Proposers should offer the smallest sum possible,
and Responders should accept. An alternative view is offered in the following account:
In the rural areas around Ithaca it is common for farmers to put some fresh
produce on a table by the road. There is a cash box on the table, and customers
are expected to put money in the box in return for the vegetables they take. The
box has just a small slit, so money can only be put in, not taken out. Also, the
box is attached to the table, so no one can (easily) make off with the money.
We think that the farmers who use this system have just about the right model
of human nature. They feel that enough people will volunteer to pay for the
fresh corn to make it worthwhile to put it out there. The farmers also know that
if it were easy to take the money, someone would do so.54

We emphasize that this is not a story of simple altruism. As noted
above, such altruism is sometimes recognized in conventional economics;
our account, in contrast, is a more complicated story of reciprocal fairness.
A concern for fairness is part of most agents’ utility function. The results of
the ultimatum game, like the behavior of the Ithaca shoppers, cannot readily
be explained on grounds of simple altruism. First of all, the games are
played between anonymous strangers. What reason is there to believe that
these people care about one another? (Most of us give little of our wealth to
anonymous strangers whom we have no reason to believe are any worse off
than we are. Similarly, most people driving by a farm do not pull over and
stuff two dollars through the mail slot, even in Ithaca. Fairness behavior is
probably reciprocal.) Second, we observe not only apparently “nice” behavior (generous offers) but also “spiteful” behavior (Responders turning
down small offers at substantial cost to the Proposers). In the ultimatum
game, people appear simultaneously nicer and more spiteful than conventional assumptions predict.
It is also no answer to say that the results of the ultimatum game are
readily predictable on the conventional model on the ground that pride and
self-conception are part of players’ utility functions. The problem with this
view is not that it is false but that it allows ad hoc, ex post additions to the
54. Richard H. Thaler & Robyn M. Dawes, Cooperation, in THALER, supra note 40, at 6, 1920.
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utility function, in such a way as to deprive the conventional model of the
ability to make any predictions. The goal of the behavioral approach is to go
back and forth between data and theory to generate predictions that will generalize.
The sort of balanced conception of human nature suggested by the ultimatum game results and the practices of farmers in Ithaca need not be informal or ad hoc. It is possible to incorporate material and nonmaterial motives,
such as the desire to be fair (to those who have been fair) and also to be
spiteful (to those who have not been fair), in a rigorous analysis. An elegant
formal treatment is offered by Matthew Rabin in a model of fairness.55
Rabin’s framework incorporates three stylized facts about behavior. Stated
simply and nonformally:
(A) People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to help those
who are being kind.
(B) People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to punish
those who are being unkind.
(C) Both motivations (A) and (B) have a greater effect on behavior as the material cost of sacrificing becomes smaller.56

Rabin shows how these assumptions about behavior can explain the behavior observed in the ultimatum game as well as other games of cooperation
such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Related work, bearing on the appropriate
role of law, has shown the role of such behavior in helping to produce norms
that solve collective action problems.57
Rabin’s theory can be viewed as a theory of manners and principles.
Generalizing from Rabin’s treatment, we might say that people can be understood as having preferences for (a) their own material payoffs and (b) those
of some others they know well, and in addition they have preferences about
(c) the well-being of some strangers whose interests are at stake, (d) their
own reputation, and (e) what kind of person they wish to be. A person’s
willingness to cooperate or to help others can be seen as a function of these
variables. The last factor is important and especially easy to overlook; the
desire to think of yourself as an honest, principled person helps explain why
most of us (though not all) do leave tips in strange restaurants and would
leave money in the box at the road-side stand. As Rabin says, people are
willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to help those who are being
or have been kind. Of course, these desires compete with others in a world
of scarce resources. We don’t recommend that Mercedes dealers adopt the
road-side stand selling technique.
55. Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM.
ECON. REV. 1281 (1993).
56. Id. at 1282.
57. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); ROBERT AXELROD, THE
COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION (1997).
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Thus behavioral economic agents have manners and scruples that can
lead them to be “nice” in some settings. But, as we observe in the ultimatum
game, people can also be provoked to be spiteful. Sometimes the fact that
another person will lose, in a material or other sense, is a benefit to the agent;
these are the conditions for spite. An agent may calculate that the costs of
benefiting another person argue strongly against a deal, even if the agent
would benefit materially. Thus Responders who receive (relatively) small
offers are willing to decline them in order to punish the rude Proposers who
tried to grab too much for themselves, even when the small offer is a substantial amount of money. Notice that this spiteful behavior is also “principled”: People are willing to pay to punish someone who has been unfair.
This is the same behavior that drives boycotts, where consumers refrain from
buying something they normally enjoy in order to punish an offending party.
Conventional economics has sometimes recognized such behavior, but it has
received little attention in law and economics, where, unfortunately, it may
often be quite relevant.58
Spiteful behavior is common under conditions of acrimony, such as
during a fight or argument. Under these circumstances, even married couples will say and do things to hurt the other party; under bad conditions, the
hurting, material or otherwise, is part of the agent’s gain. A loss to another is
a gain to oneself; even the idea of thinking of oneself as a certain kind of
person (not a doormat or a dupe) can lead in the direction of inflicting losses.
(Concern with not establishing a reputation as a doormat or a dupe may also
play a role.) This is of course the converse of circumstances of cooperative
behavior. Unfortunately, acrimony is particularly prevalent in many legal
settings, before, during, and after litigation. Much protracted litigation—
cases that fail to settle early and amicably—may arise precisely because the
two sides were unable to deal with matters in a more friendly manner.
(Divorces that end up in court are, almost by definition, acrimonious.) We
suspect that spiteful behavior is frequently observed in conditions of
acrimony even when reputational concerns are unimportant; for example, we
think that the average contestant in a divorce case that ends up in court
would be likely, in the role of Responder in the ultimatum game playing
against his soon-to-be-ex-spouse, to reject low offers, not wanting the
Proposer to benefit greatly.59
What is “fair”? Absent acrimony, spiteful behavior—such as rejection
of small offers in the ultimatum game—is typically observed in situations
58. The concepts of revenge and retribution, which are related to spite, have been discussed
by Posner. See Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 71 (1980).
59. Cf. Robert Gibbons & Leaf Van Boven, Multiple Selves in the Prisoners’ Dilemma (Nov.
16, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review) (finding that subjects are
more likely to engage in cooperative behavior in games when they have a positive impression of
their opponent than when they have a negative impression).
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where one party has violated a perceived “norm of fairness.” This raises an
obvious question: What is “fair”? In the ultimatum game, most people regard an offer of, say, a penny to the Responder as “unfair.” This perception
is an illustration of a more general pattern: People judge outcomes to be
“unfair” if they depart substantially from the terms of a “reference transaction”—a transaction that defines the benchmark for the parties’ interactions.60 When the interactions are between bargainers dividing a sum of
money to which neither is more entitled than the other (and this is common
knowledge), the “reference transaction” is something like an equal split; substantial departures are viewed as unfair and, accordingly, punished by Responders. If parties are bargaining over the division of money and both have
reason to view one side as more entitled than the other, then the “reference
transaction” is a split that favors the more-entitled party.61 And if the parties
are a consumer and a firm in the market, the “reference transaction” is a
transaction on the usual terms for the item in question.62 We will have much
more to say about this last context in Part III below. For now our goal is
simply to offer our general definition of what is “fair” and to make clear that
we do not view the term as a vague and ill-defined catch-all. Rather, we
view it as having a reasonably well-specified meaning that can generate useful predictions across a range of contexts.63
Norms. Thus far the discussion has emphasized fairness, and we will
stress this factor throughout. But fairness-related norms are a subset of a
large category of norms that govern behavior and that can operate as “taxes”
or “subsidies.” An analysis like that above could be undertaken for many
decisions in which people care not only about material self-interest but also
about their reputations and their self-conception—for example, through purchasing books, suits, vacation spots, or through smoking, recycling, discriminating on the basis of race and sex, or through choosing friends, restaurants, and automobiles. A better understanding of the ingredients of individual utility could help a great deal with both the positive and prescriptive
analysis of law. For example, it might help us understand more about (and
be better able to predict in related contexts in the future) the massive changes

60. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729-30 (1986).
61. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 261
(1985).
62. See Kahneman et al., supra note 60, at 729-30.
63. For a recent effort to incorporate a more general notion of “fairness” into the economic
analysis of tort law, see Henrik Lando, An Attempt to Incorporate Fairness into an Economic Model
of Tort Law, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 575 (1997). The relevant “fairness” notions there may be
somewhat more “ad hoc,” as Lando ultimately concludes, id. at 582, because, in contrast to the
more market-oriented contexts we consider, there is no clear “reference transaction” in the tort
context.
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in behavior that have followed largely unenforced bans on smoking in public
places—the phenomenon of “compliance without enforcement.”64
B. Bargaining Around Court Orders
1. Coasian prediction.
As noted above, an important aspect of law and economics is the Coase
theorem, which says that the assignment of a legal entitlement will not influence the ultimate allocation of that entitlement when transaction costs and
wealth effects are zero. A straightforward application of this idea is that
when a court enters a judgment, whether in the form of an injunction or a
damage award, the parties are likely to bargain to a different outcome if that
outcome is preferable to what the court did and the transaction costs and
wealth effects are small. (Thus, for instance, if the court enters a prohibitively high damage award but the activity in question is efficient, the parties
should bargain for a lower damage level, since this would increase the surplus to be shared between them.) To whom an entitlement is allocated after
litigation, and how it is protected (by a property rule or a liability rule), are
irrelevant to the ultimate allocation of the entitlement in these circumstances.
2. Behavioral analysis.
Influenced by behavioral economics, many legal commentators have observed that in light of the endowment effect described in Part I (an aspect of
prospect theory, and thus an instance of bounded rationality), the assignment
of a legal entitlement may well affect the outcome of bargaining, even when
transaction costs (as conventionally defined) and wealth effects are zero.65
This conclusion is suggested by the mugs experiments described in Part I, as
well as by a substantial body of other evidence on the endowment effect.66
The mugs results were obtained in circumstances that were the most favorable to the predictions of the conventional theory. Transaction costs were
zero and the sort of emotional attachments that can grow over time in the real
world were absent. Mug owners had become mug owners just minutes before the markets were run. Compare that with a homeowner who has been
endowed with the right to have her homestead protected from noxious fumes
being emitted nearby.

64. See Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 69 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 1993).
65. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to
Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 99 (1993).
66. See Kahneman et al., supra note 26, at 1327 tbl.1 (summarizing studies).
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Although the endowment effect suggests generally that the assignment of
a legal entitlement may affect the outcome of bargaining, such an effect is
especially likely when the entitlement is in the form of a court order obtained
after legal proceedings between opposing parties (our focus here). This is so
for several reasons.
First, the process of going through litigation may strengthen the endowment effect. Experimental evidence suggests that there is an especially
strong endowment effect when a party believes that he has earned the entitlement or that he particularly deserves it.67 Of course someone who has received a court judgment in his favor will believe that he has earned it. Such
a person may also believe strongly that this outcome is fair, based on the
self-serving bias discussed in the following section.
Bounded self-interest, and specifically the acrimony notions developed
above, provide an additional reason we might expect less bargaining in real
world settings than in law and economics texts. Even if there are financial
gains from making a deal, it is difficult to bargain without communication,
and litigants are often not on speaking terms by the end of a protracted trial.
Even if communication is possible, bargains are unlikely to be struck when
both sides take pleasure in making the other side worse off; in such circumstances it can be difficult to reach agreements on settlements even if they
would substantially improve the lot of both parties. For all of these reasons,
behavioral research suggests that injunctions and damage awards may stick
even with low transaction costs (as conventionally defined).
Note that another way of phrasing this conclusion is that the concept of
transaction costs is broader than conventional analysis assumes. The costs of
a transaction include not only the conventionally recognized ones (for example, the cost of assembling all of the relevant parties), but also costs such as
the discomfort or displeasure of dealing with an adversary. If “transaction
costs” are defined in this broader way, then, for the reasons given above,
they will very often be substantial in the case of bargaining around court orders; hence, deals are unlikely to occur. This observation illustrates an important general point. Once the behavioral analysis is understood, it can often be incorporated into economic analyses using standard concepts such as
transaction costs. This should not be taken to imply, however, that the behavioral analysis is superfluous. Under the usual account, transaction costs
would have been assumed to be zero as long as the two sides could easily
negotiate.
It is of course true that most cases settle, so that those which do not, and
which thus produce court orders, may be atypical in some respects. But that
does not mean they are unimportant objects of study for purposes of positive
67. See George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence in the Valuation of
Objects, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157, 159-61 (1994).
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analysis. With conventional law and economics, behavioral analysis is concerned with the fact (and the consequences of the fact) that some cases proceed to trial.68
Although our focus in this section is on positive analysis, there is also a
tricky normative issue: When people fail to reach bargains that would be
reached in the absence of endowment effects and spiteful behavior, is there
any problem from the standpoint of efficiency?69 On one view, the answer is
no; if the parties do not contract around a court-ordered outcome for these
reasons, then the outcome must be efficient (even if another, different outcome—favoring the other side—would also have been efficient). An underlying question, however, is whether spite ought to count in the efficiency
calculus. Some of the most prominent utilitarian philosophers believe that it
should not.70
3. Evidence.
Conventional economic theory and behavioral analysis thus generate
distinct predictions about what happens after trials. These theories can therefore be tested with empirical evidence. What happens once a court judgment
has been entered? How often do the parties bargain to a different outcome?
Consider the set of cases where the court has assigned an entitlement to the
party who values it less. In these circumstances, the standard theory would
predict contracting around the court order whenever transaction costs (as
conventionally defined) and wealth effects are small. (The possibility of
asymmetric information is discussed below in connection with the existing
empirical findings.) The behavioral theory predicts that even in such cases,
there will often be no recontracting. Since it is unlikely that court orders are,
across the board, uniquely efficient, it should be possible to test these differing predictions.
Even without this detailed type of information, data gathered by Ward
Farnsworth suggest that there is much less post-trial bargaining than the eco-

68. Conventional law and economics attributes failures to settle primarily to informational
differences among parties. There is a large body of literature on this topic, which is summarized in
Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation and Settlement, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (forthcoming 1998).
69. For a discussion of various approaches to this question in the context of endowment effects, see Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory
of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663, 675-97 (1994).
70. See John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 55-56 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). A.
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell have acknowledged this view in their analysis of punitive
damages as a response to the socially illicit gains obtained by certain defendants. See A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869,
908-10 (1998).
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nomic model would predict.71 Farnsworth interviewed attorneys from approximately twenty nuisance cases in which injunctive relief was sought and
either granted or denied after full litigation before a judge. In not a single
case of those Farnsworth studied did parties even attempt to contract around
the court order, even when transaction costs were low, and even when an
objective third party might think that there was considerable room for mutually advantageous deals. Conventional analysis might attribute failures to
reach an ultimate agreement to asymmetric information;72 but under such
analysis it is difficult to explain the complete failure even to negotiate. It is
also interesting to note that the lawyers interviewed said that the parties
would not have reached a contractual solution if the opposite result had been
reached. (This last point also means that the no-bargaining result cannot be
explained by supposing that the court orders entered were uniquely efficient.)
The lawyers’ explanations for these results are behavioral in character.
Once people have received a court judgment, they are unwilling to negotiate
with the opposing party, partly because of an unwillingness by victorious
plaintiffs to confer advantages upon their opponents. Having invested a
great deal of resources in pursuing the case all the way to court and through a
trial, victors perceive themselves as having a special right to the legally endorsed status quo, and they are unlikely to give that right up, especially to
their opponent, for all, or most, of the tea in China. Their investment in the
entitlement gives it a distinctive character. Bargains are unlikely in the extreme; the plaintiff and the defendant tend not even to think about them.
These tendencies are reinforced (according to the lawyers in Farnsworth’s
study) by the presence of acrimony between the parties; thus acrimony combines with the endowment effect to produce an absence of negotiation.
Here, as elsewhere in this article, our emphasis is on whether empirical
evidence exists to test the predictions of the conventional and behavioral
economic accounts, and, if more evidence would be helpful, what sort of
study might be most useful. It is frequently remarked that law and economics is primarily theoretical or analytic, and rarely empirical. Victory is often
declared based on a dataless model. We think that before victory can be declared for either conventional or behavioral law and economics, the fit of the
theory with the available evidence must be assessed. For behavioral analysis, it is not enough to build a model consistent with behavior observed in an
experimental setting (such as behavior in the ultimatum game or the mugs
experiments); the model must be compared and tested against what we observe in the world. A good aspiration for both conventional and behavioral
71. Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Lawsuits Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse
Inside the Cathedral (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
72. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 734 & n.66 (1996) (discussing economic models in
which asymmetric information leads to failed negotiations).
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approaches is careful empirical work that provides reasonably definitive conclusions about predictive failures and successes.
The empirical data and future empirical research discussed in this section
concern behavior after a court has entered a judgment. Of course, most cases
settle before trial, and so it is also important to ask to what degree bargaining
is likely to be successful prior to this point. This is a separate question; bargaining may be more likely in that setting because neither side has yet been
endowed through a court judgment with a clear entitlement. On the other
hand, self-serving bias and conditions of acrimony (as well as the background force of the “ordinary” endowment effect) may still preclude successful bargaining. The next section examines the effect of self-serving bias on
successful pretrial bargaining (as well as other forms of bargaining) in more
detail.
C. Failed Negotiations
1. Self-serving conceptions of fairness.
Even among the well-mannered, fair-minded agents that populate behavioral economics, self-interest is very much alive and well. For often there
will be room for disagreement about what is fair (or, equivalently, what is the
appropriate reference transaction)—and thus there will be the opportunity for
manipulation by self-interested parties. These parties may tend to see things
in the light most favorable to them; while people care about fairness, their
assessments of fairness are distorted by their own self-interest. This is a
form of bounded rationality—specifically, a judgment error; people’s perceptions are distorted by self-serving bias.
This form of bias can help to explain the frequency of failed negotiations. It is quite common, in cases involving divorce, child custody, and
even commercial disputes, to see protracted litigation in circumstances in
which it might be expected that the parties would be able to reach negotiated
solutions (although it of course remains the case that most suits settle). On
the standard account, the existence of such protracted litigation is somewhat
of a puzzle. With a good sense of the expected value of suit, parties should
settle more than they do. It may be possible to explain some of the observed
behavior in terms of asymmetric information and signaling, which may interfere with settlement prospects.73 However, this account is difficult to test.
By contrast, the effects of self-serving bias in negotiations have been tested
empirically, as described below.

73. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 6, at 109-11.
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2. Evidence.
The leading study in this area is one by Linda Babcock, Xianghong
Wang, and George Loewenstein on the consequences of self-serving bias for
negotiation impasse in public school teacher contract negotiations in Pennsylvania.74 A common element of public sector labor negotiations is for both
sides to invoke agreements in “comparable” communities, either as a measure of market conditions or as a characterization of what is fair. Do participants in a negotiation choose comparable communities in a rational manner?
Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein hypothesized that they may not; instead,
both sides may adopt self-serving judgments about which communities are
“comparable,” and impasses may result from such judgments. They designed a survey of union and school board presidents in all school districts in
Pennsylvania, in order to elicit judgments about comparable districts for purposes of salary negotiations. Respondents were asked to “list the districts
they felt were comparable to their own.”75 Note that there is no strategic incentive here to misrepresent one’s view of which districts are comparable,
either to gain an advantage in negotiations or to curry public favor for one’s
negotiating position; the only audience for the responses in the study was the
study’s authors. Nonetheless, substantial differences between the two sides
emerged. The average salary listed by union presidents for comparable districts was $27,633, compared to an average of $26,922 for school board
presidents.76 This difference was about 2.4% of the average teacher salary in
a setting in which the last offers before teacher strikes were typically about
one percent apart.77
By itself, this difference is highly suggestive; if the two sides have different views about comparable districts, bargaining impasses may well occur.
But do these self-serving views (reported to the authors of the study in response to a survey question) correlate with actual behavior? Yes. The
authors regressed the percentage of previous negotiations that ended in a
strike against the difference between the two sides’ lists of comparable districts. The regression showed that this difference had substantial explanatory
power. In those school districts where the average salary of the union’s list
is $1000 greater than the board’s list, a strike is forty-nine percent more
likely than where the average salaries of the two lists are the same.78 Thus
self-serving biases can explain real-world bargaining impasses.

74. Linda Babcock, Xianghong Wang & George Loewenstein, Choosing the Wrong Pond:
Social Comparisons in Negotiations that Reflect a Self-Serving Bias, 111 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1996).
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id. at 11.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 13.
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As already noted, strategic behavior does not seem to provide a strong
explanation for the empirical evidence on school-district negotiations. There
was no incentive in the study (as there would often be in negotiations with
the opposing party) for parties to choose comparable districts in a strategic
manner.79 The behavioral account seems to exhibit a higher “R2”—a better
ability to predict the observed data—than the standard account.
A fertile ground for future study of self-serving bias and its relationship
to bargaining impasse may be negotiations between baseball players’ agents
and team management. It is common practice in these negotiations for both
sides to use the contracts of “comparable” players as reference points, once
again as a measure of market conditions and as a characterization of what is
fair. Participants’ selection of which players are comparable may well be
colored by self-serving bias. Exploration of the impact of this behavioral
factor on the success or failure of these negotiations seems far more promising than examining the role of informational asymmetry in this setting. For
the participants have equal access to the information that defines what is a
comparable player. Thus behavioral economics appears more likely than the
conventional model to predict and account for those negotiations that fail and
end up in the hands of an arbitrator.
In addition to the existing data on school district strikes, researchers have
conducted experimental studies on the role of self-serving bias in preventing
negotiated agreements.80 The studies involved a tort case based on real litigation in Texas. Subjects—college and law students—were randomly assigned to the role of plaintiff or defendant; in this role they were asked to
negotiate a settlement. They received a short summary of the case and also
twenty-seven pages of materials from the original case. Subjects were told
that the same case materials had been given to a judge in Texas, who had
reached a judgment between $0 and $100,000. Before beginning to negotiate, subjects were asked to write down their guesses about what the judge
awarded. They were also asked to say what they considered a fair amount
for the plaintiff to receive in a settlement. The authors found quite substantial self-serving biases in subjects’ assessments of the judge’s award. The
subjects acting as the plaintiffs guessed an average $14,527 higher than the
defendants’, and the plaintiffs’ fair settlement values averaged $17,709
higher than those of the defendants.81 Nonsettlement was strongly connected
79. For a fuller discussion than space here permits of the possibility of strategic behavior, and
experimental evidence from other studies that points against such an explanation for the results, see
id. at 17-18.
80. Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff & Colin Camerer, Biased
Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995); George Loewenstein,
Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock, Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993).
81. Loewenstein et al., supra note 80, at 151.
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to the discrepancy in predictions about the judge’s likely award.82 Note that
the hypothetical, role-playing nature of this study in some ways strengthens
the interpretation of the result. In the short time that it took to read all the
materials, subjects adopted the point of view of their roles and the bias that
comes with it. Of course, the fact that roles were only hypothetical, and the
financial stakes small, means that we cannot be sure from these studies alone
that parties would display self-serving bias in real-world settings; but the
school district study suggests the importance of the bias in such settings.
3. The role of lawyers.
Are real lawyers immune from self-serving biases? There is some evidence that lawyers, as intermediators, are relatively less subject to various
cognitive biases, in ways that can help promote settlement.83 However, there
is suggestive evidence that self-serving bias does affect lawyers and judges
as well as other actors. A study of 205 bankruptcy lawyers and 150 bankruptcy judges found self-serving biases in responses to a wide range of questions involving how long it takes judges to rule on fee applications, the fairness of fees, and lawyers’ fee awards in general.84 Thus, for example, thirtytwo percent of lawyers report that they never request court-ordered compensation in excess of normal hourly rates, but judges report that only eleven
percent of lawyers never make such requests.85 This evidence does not show
that lawyers do not reduce self-serving bias in actual litigation, but it casts
doubt on the proposition that this bias is eliminated by the involvement of
professionals. To the extent that the bias is reduced through lawyers’ involvement, it suggests that part of the appropriate role of lawyers may be to
counter their clients’ predictable inclination to overstate the fairness of their
own cause. This may be difficult since clients are the ultimate decisionmakers and lawyers may have an economic interest in not settling. Thus, serious
ethical issues may arise about the lawyer’s obligations. To the extent that it
is possible for clients to be “debiased” by their lawyers, behavioral research
provides considerable guidance on which debiasing techniques are least
likely to be successful, and which might actually work.86

82. Id.
83. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997).
84. Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 979 (1994).
85. Id. at 988 tbl.3.
86. See Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Debiasing Litigation Impasse, 22 J. L. SOC. INQUIRY. 913 (1997).
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D. Mandatory Contract Terms
1. Wage and price effects.
One of the most frequent claims in the economic analysis of law is that
the imposition of mandatory terms on parties to a contract will make both
parties worse off; it will operate as an effective tax on their transaction. For
example, rules granting employees a particular level of workplace safety, or
tenants the right to a habitable apartment, will make employers and employees, or landlords and tenants, worse off.87 In this section, we suggest that
bounded rationality, in particular the endowment effect, casts doubt on the
conventional law and economics claim. Our analysis here parallels that offered by Richard Craswell several years ago in the context of mandatory
product warranties;88 we build upon Craswell in emphasizing the employment setting and in drawing upon a recent empirical study of the effects of
mandatory contract terms.
The conventional argument against mandatory terms such as those just
mentioned has two steps. First, since the parties did not bargain for the term
in question when left to their own devices, the cost of the term must exceed
its benefit (otherwise they would have agreed to it on their own). Thus, for
example, if a particular employment benefit is worth $100 per year to employees and costs the employer only $90 to provide, a mandate should not be
necessary; but if we do not observe the parties agreeing to the benefit on
their own, then the cost must exceed $100. The second step in the conventional argument is that imposing a mandatory term in these circumstances
will operate as a tax on the parties, causing the wage to fall (or, in the case of
a habitable apartment, the price to rise) by somewhere between the benefit
and the cost of the term, and causing the number of profitable trades to fall.89
Thus, in the example just given, if the cost of the benefit valued at $100 is
$110, then the employer will reduce the wage rate by somewhere between
$100 (the value of the benefit to employees) and $110 (the cost of the benefit); and the level of employment will fall. This analysis assumes an upwardsloping (not vertical) labor supply curve, but, at least for the worker group

87. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 363, 515-17; Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract
at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 954-55 (1984); Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability
and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879, 890 (1975); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517,
558 (1984).
88. Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 388-90 (1991).
89. See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON.
REV., May 1989, Papers & Proceedings, at 177, 180-81 & fig.1.
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discussed below in connection with the existing empirical evidence (female
employees), this assumption is clearly reasonable.90
The conventional account thus offers sharp predictions about the effects
of imposing mandatory contract terms. Do the data bear out these predictions? The leading study in this area is by Jonathan Gruber; Gruber examines the effects of imposing mandatory coverage of childbirth expenses in
employer-provided insurance policies.91 Imposition of the mandatory healthinsurance term—which represented a substantial departure from the usual
contractual arrangements prior to the mandate—caused the wages of affected
workers (most prominently, married women of childbearing age) to fall by at
least the cost of the mandated coverage according to most of the author’s
estimates.92 The study also found that the hours of employment of these
workers were either unchanged or slightly higher with the mandate and that
their probability of being employed was either unchanged or slightly lower.93
In sum, “[t]he findings consistently suggest shifting of the costs of the mandates on the order of 100 percent, with little effect on net labor input.”94
These findings are not easy to reconcile with the conventional account,
which predicts a fall in wages less than the cost of the benefit. (If the wage
were going to adjust by the full cost of the benefit, then some substantial
fraction of employers should have offered the benefit even prior to the mandate.)
2. Behavioral analysis.
Departures from the assumptions of expected utility maximization by
unboundedly rational agents suggest a different account of the effects of imposing mandatory contract terms, one that is consistent with the empirical
findings just described. As noted above, the endowment effect implies that
people are often less willing to sell entitlements that are given to them than
to buy entitlements that they do not already possess; if given a mug, they will
not sell it for three dollars, but if not given a mug, they will not buy one for
that price. Thus, the fact that an employee (say) chooses not to purchase a
particular workplace benefit if he is not granted an entitlement to it does not
90. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 681 tbl.28-2
(13th ed. 1989).
91. Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 622
(1994).
92. Id. at 623, 630-31, 633, 636. Gruber performs a number of different regressions; one set
did not yield statistically significant results, id. at 638, while the others yielded statistically significant results along the lines described in the text. The confidence intervals for the majority of these
results also include values indicating less than full shifting of the cost—but also, of course, values
indicating much more than full shifting of the cost.
93. Id. at 623, 633, 637.
94. Id. at 623.
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imply that he would want to sell the entitlement (if he could) once it has been
granted. The corollary of this observation is that imposing a mandatory term
may have different effects than the standard analysis predicts. In supplyand-demand terms, imagine a labor supply curve prior to the imposition of
the mandate, reflecting willingness to work at different wage levels given
provision of the benefit; the consequence of the endowment effect may be
that this curve is shifted to the right once the mandate is imposed, and this
move may more than compensate for the backward shift in the employer’s
labor demand curve as a result of the mandate. If this occurs, then the wages
of the affected worker will fall by as much as or more than the cost of the
benefit. This is precisely what the Gruber study of mandated childbirth coverage finds.95
Three caveats are important here. First, while the endowment effect is
consistent with complete or more than complete adjustment of the wage or
price, it is also possible to have less than complete adjustment of the wage or
price in the presence of the endowment effect. Perhaps workers are not any
more willing to supply labor in exchange for a given wage plus the benefit in
question once they have an entitlement to the benefit; it may be just that they
would be even less willing to supply labor in the absence of the benefit. It is
also possible that conventional economic analysis, by incorporating a market
failure such as adverse selection (a possibility generally ignored by the
above-mentioned critics of mandatory contract terms), can explain the empirical findings discussed above.96 Our point is just the modest one that the
behavioral account can predict an instance of observed behavior that is inconsistent with the standard law and economics account of mandatory terms.
Future empirical work could attempt to address the adverse selection possibility by examining the effects of mandatory contract terms in a setting in
which (in contrast to the health insurance context) adverse selection is unlikely to be a significant force.
The second qualification is that the endowment effect may not operate in
contexts in which the beneficiaries of a mandatory term must give up a preexisting level of income, since they may be highly averse to such a loss.97

95. As noted above, Richard Craswell offers an analogous analysis in the context of mandatory product warranties for consumers. See Craswell, supra note 88, at 388-90. As Craswell describes, given the endowment effect, the mandatory term may cause the price paid by consumers to
adjust by more than the cost of the term, and the quantity of the good demanded may rise. In addition to Craswell’s discussion of mandatory terms, the endowment effect has been extensively discussed in the legal literature in connection with waivable contract terms and the Coase theorem.
See, e.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1867-68 (1991) (discussing waivable terms); Kelman, supra note 1, at
678-95 (concerning the Coase theorem).
96. See Gruber, supra note 91, at 626 n.9.
97. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 12, at 277-79 (arguing that changes in welfare must
be evaluated in terms of an initial reference point and that “losses loom larger than gains”).

1508

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1471

This qualification applies only to situations in which there is a financial loss
relative to some preexisting expectation; thus it would not apply to, for example, a consumer’s purchase of a durable good at a higher price due to the
inclusion of a warranty. The final qualification here is that our analysis in
this section is purely positive, concerned with the effects of imposing a mandatory contract term. The endowment effect does not necessarily imply that,
from a normative perspective, mandatory terms are desirable; they may be
efficient, in the sense that they would not be undone (if they could be) once
imposed, but the situation without such terms is also efficient, for the same
reasons given by the standard account, and there is no obvious means by
which the two situations can be compared. Unlike several of the scenarios
discussed in Part V below, in which we think there is often a relatively strong
argument for choosing one normative benchmark over another (say because
people are likely to underestimate certain objective probabilities based on
some form of judgment error), here there does not seem to be a clear basis
for such a decision.
Our emphasis, then, is the positive question of the effects of imposing
mandatory contract terms. The primary point is that there is a substantial
research agenda to test various hypotheses; what we wish to suggest is that
the conventional view cannot be accepted a priori and that there is reason to
think that behavioral law and economics points in helpful directions.
III. THE CONTENT OF LAW
One of the goals of law and economics is to explain the content of law—
what the law allows and what it prohibits. The traditional approach provides
two tools for this analysis. First, laws may be efficient solutions to the
problems of organizing society.98 Such laws can be thought of as solutions
to optimal contracting problems with all of the affected parties at the table.
Second, laws may come about because of the rent-seeking activities of politically powerful actors; many laws that benefit farmers and concentrated
industries, for example, have been explained along these lines.99 The positive theory of law reflected in the conventional account predicts that the legal
rules we observe will be rules that either maximize social wealth (if they are
judge-made rules) or redistribute wealth to interest groups able to influence
the legislative process. Law and economics scholars who reject this account
of the content of law have not offered any alternative account to explain and
predict the rules we observe.
The notion that laws emerge from considerations of efficiency and conventional rent seeking would probably strike most citizens as odd. Instead,
98. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 569.
99. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971).
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we suspect that most members of society—which is to say most of the people
who are entitled to elect legislators—hold the view, undoubtedly naively,
that the purpose of the law is to codify “right” and “wrong.” Certainly many
criminal statutes would be explained without reference to either of the above
factors. In this section we argue that law and economics explanations of the
content of law need to be modified by incorporating the ideas of bounded
self-interest (in the form of fairness norms) and bounded rationality developed above. As we will try to show, many laws on the books appear to be
difficult to justify on efficiency grounds (for example, those that prohibit
mutually beneficial exchanges without obvious externalities) and seem to
benefit groups that do not have much lobbying power (such as the poor or
middle class). We argue that the explanation for the “anomalous” laws is
typically a quite simple one: Most people think the result is fair. We also
suggest that some laws we observe reflect neither efficiency nor conventional rent seeking but, instead, aspects of bounded rationality. Our point is
not the general (and rather obvious) one that fairness concerns and bounded
rationality may shape the content of law; we seek to show specifically how
behavioral analysis has real predictive and explanatory power. We also do
not claim that fairness concerns and bounded rationality explain every aspect
of the content of law—just that they provide a useful supplement to existing
explanations.100
The mechanisms underlying our behavioral economic account of the
content of law are simple and conventional. With the existing analysis, we
assume (for present purposes, and insofar as statutory rather than judge-made
law is concerned) that legislators are maximizers interested in their own reelection. Legislators interested in their own reelection will be responsive to
the preferences and judgments of their constituents and those of powerful
interest groups. If constituents believe that a certain practice is unfair or
dangerous, and should be banned or regulated, self-interested legislators will
respond, even if they do not share these views. Likewise, if a mobilized
group holds such views, legislators’ response will be affected, in much the
same way as if the group sought legislation to serve a narrowly defined financial self-interest, as posited by the standard account.
Mobilized groups may also attempt to manage and exploit the public’s
views, including views influenced by bounded self-interest and bounded rationality, to bolster their own efforts; a prime example discussed below is the
“availability entrepreneur,” who seeks to publicize an event in order to make
100. Our analysis in this part is similar in spirit to that offered by earlier work such as David
Cohen & Jack Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Disparities Between Measures of Economic Values, 30
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 737 (1992) (seeking to explain various legal doctrines based on the endowment effect), and Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got To Do With It?, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23
(1997) (seeking to explain criminal law based on the availability heuristic and other aspects of
bounded rationality).
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it more “available” to the general public, and thus to increase the public’s
demand for regulation. We suspect that a full account of the content of law
would have to incorporate legislators’ independent judgments about fairness
or risk, which play an occasional role; but we do not discuss that point here
because for the examples we consider, public and interest-group perceptions
seem to provide a good (and the most parsimonious) account of the laws we
observe.
A. Bans on Market Transactions
This section discusses the demand for the law insofar as that demand is
affected by people’s bounded self-interest and in particular by their taste for
fairness as they understand it. We do not mean to defend the laws that we
describe; we suggest more modestly that people’s commitment to fairness is
part of the causal mechanism that establishes those laws. Fairness norms
interact with other forces to produce some of the seemingly anomalous laws
we observe. “Fairness entrepreneurs” may play a role, mobilizing public
judgments to serve their (selfish or nonselfish) interests.
1. Bans on economic transactions.
A puzzle. A pervasive feature of law is that mutually desired trades are
blocked. Perhaps most puzzling amidst this landscape—which includes bans
on baby selling and vote trading, discussed below—are bans on conventional
“economic” transactions, such as usurious lending, price gouging, and ticket
scalping. Usury, or charging an interest rate above a certain level, is prohibited by many states in consumer lending transactions.101 Price gouging, or
the charging of “grossly excessive” or “unconscionable” prices, is prohibited
during “states of emergency” (as after a flood or other natural disaster) in
many states that have had recent experience with such events.102 Finally,
ticket scalping, or the resale of tickets at prices well above face prices (in
excess of a modest margin to cover ticket brokers’ costs), is prohibited by
roughly half of all states, including New York (with its heavy theater population).103 What accounts for these laws, which impose constraints on gain101. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.201 (1974 Act).
102. See ALA. CODE § 8-31-3 (1997); 1997 ARK. ACTS 376; CAL. PENAL CODE § 396 (West
1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-232 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160 (West 1998); GA. CODE
ANN. § 10-1-393.4 (1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:732 (West 1988); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §
396-r (McKinney 1997-1998); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1746(25) (1998).
103. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-63-201 (Michie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-289 (1997);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.36 (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-310 (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.070 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:1 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); MD.
CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 4-318 (1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140 §§ 185A, 185D (West 1994);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.465 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.805 (West 1987);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-97 (1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.395 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
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producing transactions for ordinary commodities such as television sets and
theater tickets?
Not surprisingly, economists and economically oriented lawyers often
view these laws as inefficient and anomalous.104 The laws also do not generally seem well explained in terms of conventional rent seeking by a politically powerful faction. One might argue that ticket-scalping laws are an exception to this last point, on the ground that ticket sellers (who may be politically powerful) might lobby in favor of the laws because moderate prices are
necessary to create demand, which in turn certifies quality and makes the
product more desirable.105 (Thus, for example, the argument would be that
restaurant owners do not raise prices when waits develop for tables, and if a
secondary market in restaurant reservations were to develop with very high
prices for tables, restaurateurs might wish to outlaw it.) The difficulty with
this form of argument as applied here is that it cannot explain the application
of ticket-scalping laws to perennially popular events whose quality is known
from TV and whose attractiveness to the public would not decrease significantly even with some diminution in demand—a category that includes many
professional sporting events. Our point here is actually a more general one:
Although it may be possible to offer efficiency or conventional rent-seeking
explanations for certain sorts of laws banning economic transactions,106 there
does not seem to be a general theory or set of theories that can explain all or
even most of these laws on traditional grounds.
A behavioral account. By contrast, laws banning usurious lending, price
gouging, and ticket scalping when such activities are prevalent are a straightforward prediction of the theory of perceived fairness developed in Part II.A
above. (We assume here that self-interested legislators are responsive to
citizens’ or other actors’ demand for the content of law.) In the case of each
of these bans, the transaction in question is a significant departure from the
usual terms of trade in the market for the good in question—that is, a significant departure from the “reference transaction.” Behavioral analysis predicts
that if trades are occurring frequently in a given jurisdiction at terms far from
30-46-1 (Michie 1997); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 25.13 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1998)
(effective June 1, 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-344 (1997); 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 211, 212
(West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-22-26 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-710 (Law Co-op. 1985).
104. See, e.g., John Tierney, Tickets? Supply Meets Demand on Sidewalk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 1992, at A1 (quoting New York University economist William J. Baumol criticizing laws
against ticket scalping).
105. See Gary S. Becker, A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influences on Price, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1109, 1110 (1991) (offering quality-certification argument).
106. For an argument that usury laws can be explained on conventional economic grounds,
see Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283
(1995). Peter Diamond has pointed out to us that ticket-scalping laws may be desirable to sports
team owners who wish to engage in certain types of dynamic pricing strategies over the course of
the season.
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those of the reference transaction, there will be strong pressure for a law
banning such trades. Note that the prediction is not that all high prices (ones
that make it difficult or impossible for some people to afford things they
might want) will be banned; what we predict will be banned are transactions
at terms far from the terms on which those transactions generally occur in
the marketplace.
Consider this example:
A store has been sold out of the popular Cabbage Patch dolls for a month. A
week before Christmas a single doll is discovered in a store room. The managers know that many customers would like to buy the doll. They announce over
the store’s public address system that the doll will be sold by auction to the
customer who offers to pay the most.107

Nearly three-quarters of the respondents judged this action to be either
somewhat unfair or very unfair, though, of course, an economic analysis
would judge the auction the most efficient method of assuring that the doll
goes to the person who values it most.108 Although the auction is efficient, it
represents a departure from the “reference transaction,” under which the doll
is sold at its usual price. (Of course, there would be no need for a law banning such behavior, since it does not appear to be prevalent.) As in the doll
example, if money is loaned to individuals at a rate of interest significantly
greater than the rate at which similarly-sized loans are made to other customers, then the lender’s behavior may be viewed as unfair. Since lumber generally tends to sell for a particular price, sales at far higher prices in the wake
of (say) a hurricane, which drives demand sky high, are thought unfair.
Tickets to sporting events or the theater often sell for around the face price of
the ticket, so large mark-ups over that amount are judged unfair. Consistent
with this last suggestion, subjects asked whether a team should allocate its
few remaining tickets to a key football game through an auction thought that
this approach would be unfair; allocation based on who waited in line longest
was the preferred solution.109 Of course, waiting in line for tickets is precisely what happens with laws against ticket scalping. Thus, pervasive fairness norms appear to shape attitudes (and hence possibly law) on usury, price
gouging, and ticket scalping.
“Conventional economic analyses assume as a matter of course that excess demand for a good creates an opportunity for suppliers to raise prices”
and that “[t]he profit-seeking adjustments that clear the market are . . . as
natural as water finding its level—and as ethically neutral,” but “[t]he lay
public does not share this indifference.”110 A system in which, for example,
only fans able to pay $3000 could attend the Super Bowl would be a system
107.
108.
109.
110.

Kahneman et al., supra note 60, at 735.
Id.
Kahneman et al., supra note 47, at S287-88.
Kahneman et al., supra note 60, at 735.
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characterized by the sort of severe departure from the reference transaction
that people view as intolerable. As a letter-writer to the New York Times
colorfully put it in responding to coverage of ticket-scalping laws: “With
legalized scalping, lower- and middle-income consumers would be relegated
to watching events at home or buying overpriced seats in the nosebleed section”; such a system of “entertainment Darwinism” would be a “raw deal”
for the average consumer.111
We emphasize that we need not (and do not) find these views of fairness
necessarily rational or compelling. Many of those who think “usurious”
lenders are “unfair” might not have thought through the implications of their
views (for example, that paying an outrageous price for a loan may be better
than paying an infinite price, or that a loan to a riskier borrower is a product
different in kind from a loan to a safer borrower). Still, if such views are
widespread, they may underlie certain patterns in the content of law, such as
the legal restrictions on usury, price gouging and ticket scalping. Our claim
here is a positive one about the content of the law we observe, not a prescriptive or normative one about the shape practices or rules should take. As
a positive matter, behavioral analysis predicts that if trades are commonly
occurring with terms far from those of the reference transaction, then legal
rules will often ban trades on such terms.
We do not claim to have offered a definitive explanation for the pattern
of usury, price gouging, and ticket scalping laws we observe. Usury seems
to be broadly prohibited, so one is not faced with the question of why we
observe bans in some states but not others. The same cannot be said of price
gouging and ticket scalping; each is prohibited only in certain states. Price
gouging appears to be prohibited primarily by states that have recently experienced (or whose neighbors have recently experienced) natural disasters;
and ticket scalping laws may be concentrated in states with very popular
theater or sporting events. More in-depth empirical research would be required to determine if these patterns bear out, and whether conventional interest-group theories provide an alternative account. Our goal here is simply
to suggest the likelihood, from the perspective of behavioral law and economics, that observed laws reflect, in systematic and predictable ways, fairness considerations as well as efficiency and conventional forms of rent
seeking.
Private behavior. It is interesting to note that these transaction-banning
laws often mimic, rather than constrain, the behavior of the firms they regulate. Consider first usury: It is a well-known puzzle of lending markets that
lenders often refuse to loan money to risky borrowers even at above-market
interest rates; rather, someone either qualifies for a loan at the offered rate or
111. Russ Haven & Amy Chester, Letter to the Editor, Ticket-Scalping Laws Protect the Average Fan, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1995, at A26.
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does not qualify for a loan at all.112 This is true even when a modest increase
in the interest rate would not violate usury laws.113 (Adverse selection considerations may also explain this behavior,114 but they cannot easily explain
the existence of laws against such behavior.) Price gouging and ticket
scalping are similar in terms of private actors’ behavior. Thus, when Hurricane Andrew hit Florida and the demand for lumber and other building supplies skyrocketed, Home Depot, a major national chain, continued to sell
these goods at its usual prices, despite the fact that the stock could have been
sold at an enormous (short-term) profit, and despite the fact that no law
banned price increases.115 More generally, economists have often remarked
on the failure of firms to increase prices in response to temporary increases
in demand.116 Likewise, an interesting feature of ticket-scalping laws is that
they will keep prices down only to the extent that firms choose to sell tickets
at reasonable prices in the first place; but in fact firms routinely do this.117
For example, during the 1997 NBA playoffs, the Chicago Bulls sold some
tickets to the general public at prices that were somewhat higher than regular
season games but a fraction of the price the tickets commanded on the (legal
in Illinois) ticket broker open market. As the head of a major theater company explained, “there’s a strong public relations argument” against raising
prices for tickets for very popular shows (and presumably sporting events as
well)—despite excess demand for seats at the going prices—because the
public already believes “that Broadway ticket prices are too high.”118 “Even
though we could sell tickets at $100,” another theater owner said, “we’d be
cutting our own throats because it would be a P.R. disaster for Broadway.”119
Why would it be a “P.R. disaster” if the market would allow them to sell
112. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic
Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237, 258 (1996)
(discussing the residential mortgage lending market); BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING BY
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 34 (1993) (same).
113. See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 112, at 258 & n.85.
114. See Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented
Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1566-68 (1995) (citing
Joseph P. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71
AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981)).
115. See Steve Lohr, Lessons from a Hurricane: It Pays Not to Gouge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1992, at D1, D5.
116. See David D. Haddock & Fred S. McChesney, Why Do Firms Contrive Shortages? The
Economics of Intentional Mispricing, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 562, 562-63 (1994) (surveying the economic literature).
117. See Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, Assessing the Economic Rationale and
Legal Remedies for Ticket Scalping, 16 J. LEGIS. 1, 8-9 (1989), for fairness explanations of this
behavior.
118. Peter Passell, If Scalpers Can Get So Much, Why Aren’t Tickets Costlier?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1993, at D2 (quoting Gerald Schoenfeld, head of the Shubert Organization).
119. Tierney, supra note 104, at D24 (quoting Rocco Landesman, president of Jujamcyn
Theaters).
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their tickets at $100? We think this would be so because a $100 ticket price
for a very popular show would have been viewed as unfair by many members of the public given that the usual price for a ticket was below this.
Consistent with the foregoing analysis, recent evidence of price stickiness shows that firms’ behavior seems to be affected greatly by their customers’ perceptions of unfair price increases.120 Note that this is not a standard
reputation story; fairness considerations are the reason that raising prices
harms the firm’s reputation. None of this is to say that firms never raise
prices in an opportunistic fashion; for instance, when sports teams sell playoff tickets to season ticket holders at below-market prices, it may be that the
ticket holders paid a premium for the playoff tickets ex ante (through the
purchase of season tickets). In each of the contexts we examine, our point is
just the modest one that fairness norms often seem to constrain firms’ behavior in much the same way that they shape laws against behavior violating
those norms. Consistent with our analysis, it appears that firms typically
support and even lobby for laws against ticket scalping.121
Why then are the laws necessary? Some of the relevant actors will not
be constrained by fairness norms in the absence of a law. Noninstitutional
lenders may be willing to lend at exorbitant rates; suppliers selling lumber
out of the back of pick-up trucks will often charge whatever the market will
bear (as occurred after Hurricane Andrew);122 ticket scalpers, who are typically anonymous actors engaged in one-time transactions, have no reason to
keep prices down. It is these actors who are regulated by the law. The more
powerful mainstream firms will tend to support, or at least not oppose, rules
banning unfair transactions. (Note, though, that their support would not be
predicted by the standard account.)
2. Other bans.
Laws banning economic transactions are just a species of a broader form
of regulation of transactions. Many deals are blocked, across a wide range of
contexts. People may not buy and sell body parts.123 They cannot sell their
votes.124 In some states, commercial surrogacy is prohibited,125 and baby
120. ALAN BLINDER, ELIE R.D. CANETTI, DAVID E. LEBOW & JEREMY B. RUDD, ASKING
ABOUT PRICES: A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING PRICE STICKINESS 9-10, 149-64 (1998).
121. See Steve Kukolla, Ticket Selling: One Big Unhappy Family, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J.,
June 20-26, 1994, at 36A; Senate Committee OKs Bill to Legalize Scalping of Tickets, ATLANTA
CONST., Mar. 20, 1997, at 2.
122. See Lohr, supra note 115, at D1.
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1991).
124. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 987
(1985).
125. See Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1117 n.226 (1998) (citing state statutes).
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selling is banned in all states.126 People may not contract around bans on
race and sex discrimination, as for example through written agreements.127
Blocked trades can be found in every American jurisdiction.
Bans of this variety raise serious normative questions; those questions
have been well-ventilated. Doubtless reasonable distinctions can be drawn
between bans in different areas; sometimes externalities are readily apparent.
We make a simple positive point here: Behavioral analysis suggests that
pervasive judgments about fairness may account for many such bans on voluntary deals. Whether or not those judgments make sense, they seem to be
widespread, and they help to explain the persistence of legislation that is often difficult to explain by reference to an efficiency or rent-seeking account.
In banning certain deals, legislators may be responding to community sentiments about what kinds of things are properly subject to market arrangements. The reference transaction in these areas is generally “no transaction”;
just as the norm or benchmark is the usual or face price of the ticket, or an
equal division of the amount to be divided in the ultimatum game, the norm
or benchmark here is “no market exchange.” Departures from that norm are
viewed as unfair and are prohibited.
How could this behavioral theory of law be tested? One idea is to determine, based on historical evidence, what sorts of transactions were generally not engaged in (despite their being technologically feasible—for example, baby selling) regardless of the existence of a law banning them. These
transactions could be said to have a no-transaction benchmark. (The importance of looking to a pre-law benchmark is that the existence of a legal ban
could itself produce a no-market-exchange reference point, in which case the
reference point obviously could not account for the existence of the ban.)
Behavioral analysis predicts that such transactions will be legally censured.
The existing law and economics analysis, by contrast, predicts that such
transactions will be banned only if a ban is either efficient or favorable to a
politically powerful interest group.
B. Prior Restraints on Speech
Another instance in which fairness-related norms, and in addition
bounded rationality, may affect law involves one of the enduring puzzles in
First Amendment law: the special judicial hostility to “prior restraints” on
126. See Margaret Jane Radin, What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Baby Selling?, 26 PAC. L.J.
135, 135 (1995).
127. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974) (dicta). The specific
issue presented in Alexander—the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims—
has been considered in more recent cases. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20 (1991). However, no court to our knowledge has suggested that Gilmer or any other recent
case permits people to “sell” their substantive rights not to be subject to race and sex discrimination.
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speech, most notably injunctions.128 A court may well refuse to issue an injunction against speech even if it would allow subsequent punishment of that
same speech. The puzzle is that a prior restraint involves subsequent punishment too; what an injunction means is that a violator will be subject to
(subsequent) sanctions. Why is a criminal statute any less problematic than
an injunction whose violation produces criminal penalties?
Conventional economic analysis provides no satisfying answer to this
question. True, the injunction might be thought to create the prospect of a
greater total punishment for the speech, but no one has suggested that the
First Amendment imposes limits on the severity of punishment for speech
that the government is entitled to criminalize. In any case, many criminal
statutes impose greater punishments than many injunctions, and the latter are
nonetheless more troublesome than the former.
Can behavioral analysis explain the law’s special treatment of prior restraints? As noted in Part I.B above, court-ordered remedies are likely to
create special forms of attachment for their beneficiaries; individuals will
typically be reluctant to forego rights granted by such remedies, due to the
perceived unfairness of that outcome and the type of attachment created by
the endowment effect. This is apt to be as true for prosecutors as for everyone else. A prosecutor who has sought an injunction may be particularly
insistent on ensuring that punishment occurs. A criminal statute, standing by
itself and unaccompanied by an injunction, is likely to produce a different
response on the part of the prosecutor. Reasonable defendants know the difference. Hence it is especially important for a court to ensure that any injunction imposed on speech is not issued in advance of an accurate judgment
that the speech involved is unprotected by the First Amendment.
As it happens, this account matches the most sophisticated defenses of
the special barrier to prior restraints.129 Those defenses urge that the real
purpose of the prior restraint doctrine is to ensure that no regulation is imposed without a reliable judgment that the First Amendment does not protect
the speech at risk. The doctrine is difficult to explain on conventional economic principles but is a natural inference from behavioral ones.

128. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V.
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1183-96 (3d ed. 1996).
129. See Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 55 (1984).
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C. Anecdote-Driven Environmental Legislation (With Particular Reference
to Superfund)
1. Estimating the likelihood of uncertain events.
Thus far the discussion has focused on the role of bounded self-interest
(specifically, fairness-related norms) and the endowment effect in predicting
and explaining the content of law. But judgment errors by boundedly rational individuals also play a significant role here. In particular, people seek
law in areas such as environmental protection on the basis of their judgments
about the probabilities associated with certain harmful activities. Their
judgments about probabilities will often be affected by how “available” other
instances of the harm in question are, that is, on how easily such instances
come to mind. In this section we offer an account of the Superfund statute,
perhaps the most well-known and popular environmental statute, on this
ground.
Here is a familiar example of availability: Individuals asked how many
seven-letter words in a 2,000-word section of a novel end in “ing” give much
larger estimates than individuals asked how many words in such a section
have “n” as the second-to-last letter, despite the fact that objectively there are
more words which satisfy the latter criterion than the former.130 Reliance on
how “available” instances of the event in question are is a form of judgment
error, but the error is fully rational—in the sense of reflecting optimizing
behavior—for people with limited information. Still, it can lead to systematic errors in probability assessment. In the context of environmental legislation, it encourages the well-known “pollutant of the month” syndrome,
where regulation is driven by recent and memorable instances of harm.131
When beliefs and preferences are produced by a set of probability judgments,
made inaccurate by the availability heuristic, legislation will predictably become anecdote-driven. Many illustrations come to mind; consider the outcry
over Agent Orange and Times Beach,132 or the strict regulation of asbestos in
schools after a large amount of media attention.133 The same phenomenon
may occur in other areas of regulatory law; an example here is the move to-

130. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 295 (1983).
131. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1188.
132. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, Fetal Harm Is Cited As Primary Hazard In Dioxin Exposure,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at A1, A20.
133. See Asbestos Hazard Emergency Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-56 (1994); Margo L.
Stoffel, Comment, Electromagnetic Fields and Cancer: A Legitimate Cause of Action or a Result of
Media-Influenced Fear, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 551, 590 (1995) (referring to an ABC news special
on how media reports “heightened anxiety over . . . asbestos in schools”).
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ward heavy regulation of school bus safety in the wake of media coverage of
school bus accidents in which children were killed.134
What determines how available a particular environmental hazard is?
Two factors are particularly important: the observed frequency of the hazard
and its salience. Thus, if a particular hazard has materialized recently, people are likely to attach a higher probability to its occurring in the future. And
this is particularly true if the hazard has a high degree of salience—as, for
instance, with the discovery of asbestos in schools, where many children are
present. Apart from the nature of the event, salience is heavily influenced by
the way the event is packaged by the media, organized interest groups, and
politicians.
Interested actors in the private and public sectors can be expected to exploit the availability heuristic for their own purposes. These actors are amateur behavioralists, operating strategically to promote their selfish or nonselfish goals. “Availability entrepreneurs” will thus focus attention on a specific event in order to ensure that this event will be salient and available to
many members of the public.135 Well-organized groups in the private sector
very frequently use this strategy, thus showing that they are fine behavioralists. Self-interested politicians may use similar strategies to enhance their
reelection prospects. Although self-serving behavior by such actors is an
element of the conventional economic account, the role of such factors as
availability is not; this is what is added by behavioral analysis.
The availability heuristic can lead to under- as well as over-regulation.
People sometimes (although not always) underestimate the likelihood of lowprobability or low-salience events because these threats simply do not make
it onto people’s “radar screens”;136 many health and environmental risks
(such as the health threats from poor diet and exercise) may fit this description with some parts of the population. But when a particular threat, even an
unlikely one, becomes available, as when, for example, asbestos is discovered in schools, then regulation will be demanded. The behavioral account
thus predicts a patchwork of environmental laws characterized by both overand under-regulation, with over-regulation when a particular risk has recently materialized, particularly if the harm in question is highly salient.

134. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 14146 (1990).
135. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation (Apr.
26, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
136. See Howard Kunreuther, The Economics of Protection Against Low Probability Events,
in DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRY 195, 209 (Gerardo R. Ungson & Daniel N.
Braunstein eds., 1982); Howard Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB.
POL’Y 227, 235-36, 243-44 (1976). For a discussion of overestimation of the likelihood of lowfrequency events, see Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POL. ANAL. & MGMT. 565, 566 (1989).
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2. Superfund.
The basic point that availability may affect the demand for environmental legislation is not new.137 We wish to add two features to the analysis:
first, an understanding of the mechanisms through which the availability heuristic may operate to produce environmental legislation (and here we emphasize the notion of “availability entrepreneurs”); and second, the fact that the
behavioral account predicts the enactment of Superfund, a major piece of
environmental legislation that is not readily explained on conventional
grounds.138
Conventional approaches point to the important role of interest groups in
shaping environmental law; these groups can use the law to redistribute resources in their preferred directions. Some of these groups are sincerely
concerned with environmental protection; others have economic interests for
which environmental issues operate as a smokescreen. Explanations of this
kind have had some success, but they fail to account for Superfund.
Of course it is possible (as it always is) to generate post hoc accounts
that show that some groups benefited from legislation, and to suggest that
such legislation was passed because some groups benefited from it. Superfund is no exception. But an examination of the history of the statute shows
that this explanation is extremely weak. Interest groups played little part in
initiating its enactment. Instead the key actor, as described more fully below,
was the Environmental Protection Agency, and the key mechanism was the
availability heuristic.
Superfund was passed with substantial legislative and public support; in
light of its crudely drafted character and uncertain empirical support, what is
remarkable is how little opposition the statute provoked. What is even more
remarkable is that for the last seventeen years, Americans have consistently
ranked “abandoned toxic waste dumps” among the three most important environmental problems, even though experts believe that this is one of the
least pressing environmental problems, if indeed it qualifies as a serious
problem at all.139 Experts contend that in terms of risks to human health,
there are at least a dozen problems that are more serious; many of them receive less in the way of public (and legislative) support.
Availability provides a convincing explanation of Superfund’s existence
and its endurance. Its initial development occurred when officials within the
137. See W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 96 (1998) (discussing role of availability);
Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 762 (1990) (same); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments,
and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 265-66 (1996) (same).
138. We draw here from the more detailed discussion in Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 135.
139. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 21 (1993).
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EPA, concerned about an apparent gap in federal law and eager to consolidate their authority over issues of public health, began to draft new legislation in order to respond to the existence of abandoned hazardous waste sites.
But it is doubtful that the EPA could have succeeded if not for the fact that in
August of 1978, national news began to focus on what was soon seen as a
“ticking time bomb” at Love Canal, New York, consisting of apparent leaks
from the disposal of 21,000 tons of chemical waste into the Canal between
1943 and 1952. In the middle and late 1970s, studies of groundwater and
cancer incidence appeared to show that the leaks had created serious health
risks, to the point where the New York Health Commissioner declared a
public emergency on August 2, 1978. Within two weeks, President Carter
declared an emergency in the area. A kind of cascade effect occurred, and
hence in the period between August and October, 1978, the national news
was saturated with stories of the risks to citizens near Love Canal.
The publicity continued in 1979 and 1980, the crucial years for Superfund’s enactment. There can be no doubt that the Love Canal publicity was
pivotal to the law’s passage in 1980. In that year, Time magazine made the
topic a cover story, and network documentaries followed suit. Polls showed
that eighty percent of Americans favored prompt federal action to identify
and clean up potentially hazardous abandoned waste sites. Congress responded quickly with the new statute. And to this date, American presidents
and serious presidential candidates of both parties invoke abandoned hazardous waste dumps as a leading environmental problem. By the way, it remains unproven that Love Canal created significant health risks at any stage.
The behavioral account of Superfund is that the availability of “Love
Canal” as a symbol for the problem of abandoned hazardous waste dumps
greatly intensified public concern, to the point where a legislative response
became nearly inevitable, no matter what the actual facts might be.140 And
there can be no doubt that proponents of Superfund self-consciously exploited the Love Canal incident. During crucial periods in the legislative
debate, the prime proponent of the new legislation—the EPA—warned, very
publicly, that hundreds of “Love Canals” could be found throughout the
country. The EPA thus became an “availability entrepreneur,” focusing attention on a specific event in order to ensure that this event would be highly
available to many members of the public.
We do not say that conventional interest-group considerations played no
role in the specific shape the Superfund statute took. The ultimate design of
the statute surely owed a great deal to what relevant interest groups were
willing to tolerate; though powerful private groups did not seek the legisla140. Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with Divergent Risk Information, 107 ECON. J.
1657 (1997) (finding that in the presence of divergent information about risks, people place inordinate weight on high risk assessments).
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tion, they did influence its content and structure. But the enactment and
continued popularity of Superfund are not predicted by the conventional account alone. The behavioral account, in contrast, suggests that the occurrence of an event such as Love Canal, particularly when played up and
dramatized by the media and other actors, will produce a legislative response. Superfund is one example; regulatory responses to Agent Orange
and asbestos in schools are others. Available instances of risk or threat seem
to shape the content of law.
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS
In this part we shift our focus from the positive to the prescriptive. Instead of seeking to explain what the effects of law will be and why we have
the laws we do, we now explore how the law can best be structured to
achieve specified ends—deterring socially undesirable behavior through the
tort system, encouraging measures that enhance human health, and so on.
Our claim in each context we consider is that attention to behavioral insights
can improve the law’s ability to move society toward desired outcomes. Our
primary emphasis is on problems in processing information, problems that
create difficulties both for juries during trials and for those responding to
information required by government or coming from government itself.
Thus bounded rationality, in the form of both judgment errors and behavior
in accordance with prospect theory rather than expected utility theory, are the
central emphases in this part. Section A deals with juries, while section B
deals with government information campaigns and mandatory disclosure.
Section C emphasizes our second bound on human behavior, bounded willpower, and discusses its relevance to prescriptions directed toward deterring
crime.
This part discusses only a small sample of the many areas in which
sound prescriptive analysis may require us to consider possible bounds on
jurors’ or other actors’ decisionmaking. Other authors have applied these
insights to other topics in the economic analysis of law. Thus, for example,
Daniel Kahneman and David Schkade, along with one of the present authors
(Sunstein), have challenged the economic prescription for punitive damage
awards recently offered by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell: that
juries should be instructed to focus on the probability of nondetection of the
tortfeasor’s activities in order to achieve optimal deterrence through punitive
awards.141 From the behavioral point of view, this prescription fails to appreciate the cognitive and motivational limitations on jury decisionmaking.
Because of the hindsight bias and overoptimism problems described below,
juries will have difficulty making probability estimates, and in addition they
141. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 70, at 887-91.
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appear to come to the task of awarding punitive damages with strong retributive instincts.142 The goal of optimal deterrence may be best achieved
through administrative agencies rather than juries.143
Another example of the application of behavioral economics to prescriptive analysis is Thomas Jackson’s discussion of discharge policy in bankruptcy law. Although standard economic ideas of risk allocation would often
support nondischargeability of debts, Jackson draws on aspects of what we
have termed bounded rationality and bounded willpower to support the
“fresh start” policy of discharge and to sketch the specific contours it should
take.144 Our goal in this part is to point to some additional topics in the economic analysis of law in which a more accurate understanding of decisionmaking can improve upon conventional law and economics prescriptions.
A. Negligence Determinations and Other Determinations of Fact or Law
1. Background.
Frequently juries are called upon to determine the probability of an event
that ended up occurring; a prominent example is the negligence standard,
which (in the formulation favored by the economic analysis of law) requires
jurors to assess the costs and benefits of the defendant’s course of action
from an ex ante perspective, and thus to determine the probability that harm
would end up coming of that action. These determinations are made with the
“benefit” of hindsight; jurors know at the time they make their decision that
the event in question did in fact occur. Jurors’ determinations are thus likely
to be afflicted by “hindsight bias”—the tendency of decisionmakers to attach
an excessively high probability to an event simply because it ended up occurring.145
Hindsight bias has been observed in a large number of studies, including
studies of “expert” actors such as physicians, who, when asked to assess the
probabilities of alternative diagnoses, given a set of symptoms, offer significantly different estimates depending on what they are told the actual diagnosis turned out to be.146 Hindsight bias also appears to occur in the specific

142. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2111-12 (1998).
143. Id. at 2122-25.
144. Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393,
1394-95, 1399-1401 (1985).
145. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE
288 (1975).
146. Hal R. Arkes, David Faust, Thomas J. Guilmette & Kathleen Hart, Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305, 306 tbl.1 (1988).
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context of negligence determinations.147 In the negligence studies, subjects
in the role of jurors—armed with knowledge that harm had in fact occurred—were found to attach significantly higher probabilities to harm than
subjects in the role of ex ante decisionmakers—those not informed of the
occurrence of harm.148 This is a straightforward prediction of the many prior
studies on hindsight bias.149 Although the negligence studies asked for individual rather than group probabilities (raising the question whether group
interaction on an actual jury could dispel hindsight bias), other studies have
found hindsight bias in group as well as individual settings.150
Hindsight bias will lead juries making negligence determinations to find
defendants liable more frequently than if cost-benefit analysis were done correctly—that is, on an ex ante basis. Thus, plaintiffs will win cases they deserve to lose. This prediction is consistent with the frequently expressed
(though difficult to verify) view that the tort system imposes too much liability.151
A threshold issue raised by the hindsight-bias account of negligence determinations is whether hindsight bias is simply a countervailing weight to a
tendency on the part of defendants to underestimate the likelihood of being
sanctioned. A common feature of human behavior is overoptimism: People
tend to think that bad events are far less likely to happen to them than to others. Thus, most people think that their probability of a bad outcome is far
less than others’ probability, although of course this cannot be true for more
than half the population.152 If defendants exhibit such overoptimism, then
they will be underdeterred by a correct application of the negligence stan147. See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
89 (1995); Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1996).
148. Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 147, at 98; LaBine & LaBine, supra note 147, at 50910.
149. See, e.g., Arkes et al., supra note 146.
150. See Dagmar Stahlberg, Frank Eller, Anne Maass & Dieter Frey, We Knew It All Along:
Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 46 (1995); Ed Bukszar
& Terry Connolly, Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some Problems in Learning from Experience, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 628 (1988).
151. See, e.g., JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 42-43 (1975); John G. Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans, 30
AM. J. COMP. L. 297, 311 (1982); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 555, 581-82 (1985).
152. See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED.
481 (1987) [hereinafter Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism]. For discussion of the distinction between being below the average person’s probability of a negative event and being below the average probability of that event (which could in fact be true for the majority of people), see Christine
Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming
1998).
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dard; overestimation of the probability of harm based on hindsight bias might
then be a desirable countervailing factor. We think that defendant overoptimism is likely to be a much smaller factor for firms than for individual defendants, since firms that make systematic errors in judgment will be at a
competitive disadvantage. And for individuals, the role of overoptimism is
likely to vary significantly with context. In a case in which the threat of being found liable is highly salient, individuals may tend to overestimate the
likelihood of being sanctioned, for reasons discussed in connection with our
account of Superfund above. Hindsight bias, in contrast, seems to be an
across-the-board phenomenon; it has been observed in a wide range of contexts across many studies and is likely to be present whenever a jury makes a
negligence determination.
It is also possible that the occurrence of harm itself provides genuine information about the probability of harm; this fact has led some to consider
the possibility of an “ex post negligence” standard, under which negligence
is assessed based on the information available ex post, rather than ex ante.153
(However, if prospective defendants cannot easily ascertain (ex ante) the information that will be available ex post, then an ex post approach may be
inefficient.154) But, even apart from situations in which the fact of harm provides new information about the probability of harm, hindsight bias suggests
that decisionmakers will weigh the fact of harm heavily in assessing its probability.155
The findings on hindsight bias provide new empirical support for the old
idea that such bias may distort negligence determinations. Despite the vast
law and economics literature in the area of torts, no attention seems to have
been paid to the potentially significant implications of hindsight bias for
achieving optimal deterrence—the goal posited by that literature, and the
goal on which we focus here. (Thus, we accept this goal for purposes of our
prescriptive analysis; we do not necessarily endorse this goal from a normative perspective.) Law and economics scholars generally approve of the use
of the negligence standard for achieving the goal of optimal deterrence; the
negligence standard, if applied in an error-free fashion, leads to an efficient
level of precaution (although other standards will as well; note that these
other standards may be worse or better along other dimensions, such as encouraging victim precautions and inducing optimal activity levels).156 These
153. Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorik, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585, 590 (1985).
154. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Informed Courts, Uninformed Individuals and the Economics of
Judicial Hindsight, 151 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 613 (1995).
155. For an example of a situation in which the fact of harm does not provide new information about its probability, see Calabresi & Klevorik, supra note 153, at 594-96.
156. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 8, 11, 14, 23-24
(1987) (analyzing rules of negligence and strict liability).
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scholars have also analyzed reasons that legal rules, including the negligence
standard, may be imperfectly applied, but they do not offer any clear prescriptions for addressing this problem, since as they see it, the problem does
not have a clear direction; either underdeterrence or overdeterrence relative
to correct application of the cost-benefit standard is possible.157 In contrast,
we can offer clear prescriptions because the hindsight bias points in only one
direction: overdeterrence (again relative to what correct cost-benefit analysis
would produce).
In fact the law in areas such as patent law already takes clear steps to address the problems caused by hindsight bias. Thus, as Jeffrey Rachlinski has
recently pointed out, patent courts are required to guard against hindsight
bias in determining whether an invention was “nonobvious” at the time of
invention—despite its now (perhaps) seeming obvious—by looking to such
“secondary considerations” as “commercial success, long felt but unsolved
need, [and] failure of others”;158 this is in effect a limited form of debiasing
of the decisionmaker. (Thus, the law seems to acknowledge that judges, like
juries, may exhibit hindsight bias—although there is evidence that the bias is
less for judges than juries.159) But in the area of tort law the existing responses are partial and incomplete at best.160 Hindsight bias seems to be so
deeply ingrained in the tort system that even when it is called to a court’s
attention, it may be difficult for the court (never mind a juror) to recognize or
address it. A colorful example is provided by litigation in which one of the
present authors (Thaler) was an expert witness. The litigation involved
whether investment decisions involving $100 million in assets had been
made in a negligent fashion. Although the court explicitly recognized that
“[c]ase law . . . ties [this determination] to the circumstances extant at the
time in question, rather than as they may appear in hindsight,” the court
characterized as “very imaginative” defendant’s offer of testimony that “a
decision based on information known at the time the decision was made can
be evaluated as good or bad without regard to the outcome. In that way the
evaluation is not biased by hindsight.”161 Although the judge was very active
throughout the trial, he never suggested that the expert testimony offered by
the plaintiff, which focused almost exclusively on the fact that the portfolio
had lost money (rather than on the reasonableness of the investment decisions at the time they were made), was off-target or irrelevant. While the
157. See, e.g., Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Finding and Efficiency: Toward an Economic Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 154-64 (1987).
158. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571, 615 (1998) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)).
159. See Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance
as a Risk Manager (May 21, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
160. Rachlinski describes several existing responses. See Rachlinski, supra note 158, at 61518.
161. Johnson v. Johnson, 515 A.2d 255, 266-67 & n.17 (N.J. Super. 1986).
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court ultimately accepted the “imaginative” argument of the defendant and
ruled in his favor, its evident surprise at the nature of the argument suggests
the pervasiveness of hindsight-based thinking in the tort system.
How might the law respond to hindsight bias in tort cases? An obvious
response is the use of jury instructions that inform jurors of the bias and tell
them to focus on the ex ante situation. Unfortunately, such debiasing techniques appear either to have no effect on decisions or to reduce hindsight
bias by only a limited degree, leaving a significant gap between ex post and
ex ante decisionmaking.162 The findings on the limited effect of debiasing
techniques suggest that attempts by lawyers to employ such techniques may
also be of limited effectiveness, although there is room here for future research on the role of lawyers. Because of the apparent limits on debiasing,
we propose two alternative prescriptions—one simple and clear-cut, but limited to certain sorts of cases, and the other general and giving rise to important avenues for future research.
2. Prescriptions.
First prescription: Manipulate the information given to jurors. One
means of responding to the problem of hindsight bias in tort cases involves
manipulating the set of information given to jurors. Suppose that a foodprocessing company is claimed to have decided in a negligent fashion to use
a particular chemical in its production process; imagine that the chemical
ended up causing cancer in a small number of residents who live near the
company’s plant. The company claims that not using the cancer-causing (as
it turned out) chemical would have carried significant risks to residents in
terms of bacterial contamination. We know that if jurors are told that the
chemical was used and ended up causing cancer, they will be likely to overestimate the probability of harm from the chemical and, thus, hold the foodprocessing company liable even if liability is not in fact justified under an
unbiased application of the cost-benefit standard. (Indeed, in this context the
effects of hindsight bias may be exacerbated by the fact that the choice made
by the defendant is an act of commission, rather than (as would have been
the case had the chemical not been used) an act of omission.163)
Imagine, however, that jurors are not told that the company decided to
use the chemical; rather they are told only about the ex ante decision facing
162. See, e.g., Martin F. Davies, Reduction of Hindsight Bias by Restoration of Foresight
Perspective: Effectiveness of Foresight-Encoding and Hindsight-Retrieval Strategies, 40 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 40, 61-64 (1987); Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 349, 354-56 (1977); Kamin & Rachlinski, supra
note 147, at 96-98.
163. See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263 (1990).
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the company (whether to use the chemical). They learn about the benefits
and costs of that strategy and must determine whether either pursuing it or
failing to pursue it would have been negligent. In this scenario the jurors
would be transformed into ex ante decisionmakers: They wouldn’t know
whether the “accident” that occurred (prompting the lawsuit) was harm from
bacterial contamination or harm from the chemical. Because they would not
know what harm ended up materializing, they would not be led by hindsight
bias to overestimate the probability of that harm. Their probability estimates
for each type of harm—and their resulting assessment of whether either decision by the company would have been negligent—would be untouched by
hindsight bias. In this way it might be possible to eliminate the effect of
hindsight bias on negligence determinations. (If the decision that the defendant actually made was one that the jury determined to be negligent, outcome
information could be introduced for purposes of computing damages.)
It is important to note the structure of this example: The defendant faced
a choice of options, each of which could have caused harm. In this sort of
case, jurors assessing the defendant’s conduct would not know (if they were
not told) whether the harm that prompted the suit was caused by choice of
the first option or choice of the second. It is also important to note that various procedural steps would have to be taken to protect the secrecy of the defendant’s choice if outcome information were to be kept from the jury; lawyers’ affiliations, for example, could not be revealed, and witnesses could not
be identified as defense-side or plaintiff-side. (One might worry that the
food-processing company’s employees would testify in a way that revealed
what choice the company made. But it would not be in the company’s interests to have its employees testify in such a one-sided fashion, since then jurors would suspect which choice was made and would tend to engage in
hindsight-biased decisionmaking to the defendant’s detriment.)
In some cases, it might not be possible to keep the defendant’s choice
from the jury; the fact of the suit will make clear what that choice was. For
example, in the well-known case of Petition of Kinsman Transit Co.,164 in
which a bridge operator failed to lift the bridge in time to prevent an accident, apparently because he was at a tavern, the fact of a suit may provide
strong indication that the bridge was not lifted. In this sort of setting, a possible prescription (offered previously in the literature) involves bifurcation of
trials, so that jurors deciding on liability do not learn any of the details of
what happened until an initial determination of liability is made.165 Although
164. 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964).
165. Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule:
Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 633-36 (1994); Norman G. Poythress, Richard
Wiener & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reframing the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Debate: Social
Science Research Implications for Non-Economic Reforms, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 65, 105-11
(1992); David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias
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we think this is a sensible prescription in such settings, we note that it will
not eliminate the effects of hindsight bias, since (as proponents of bifurcated
trials recognize) “the jury will undoubtedly know that they are not being
asked simply to engage in an academic exercise,”166 and that (because a trial
is being held) “a bad outcome must have occurred.”167 In contrast, in cases
in which jurors need not know (because they cannot infer from the fact of a
lawsuit) what choice the defendant made, it may be possible to eliminate the
hindsight bias completely. And there are many such situations: cases in
which either of two options facing a physician could have caused harm or
death to a patient; cases in which either the use or the failure to use a new
technology could have led to harm; cases in which either revealing or failing
to reveal suicide threats by a psychiatric patient could have resulted in suicide.
A further feature of our prescription here is that even if we are wrong
about the effects of hindsight bias, the prescription seems unlikely to do significant harm (from the perspective of the specified goal of achieving correct
application of the ex ante cost-benefit standard). If hindsight bias is unimportant, then whether jurors are told what outcome occurred should not matter; either way, they should be able to make a correct ex ante determination.
Thus, the prescription should either have no effect on decisionmaking (if
hindsight bias is not a problem) or represent an improvement over the current
system (if hindsight bias is a problem).
Second prescription: Alter the evidentiary standard. The result of hindsight bias, as described above, is that jurors will overestimate the probability
that harm will occur (since harm did, in fact, occur). The determination of
the probability of harm would conventionally be made under a “preponderance of the evidence” standard: If jurors think it more likely than not, based
on the evidence, that the probability of harm was above the threshold level
required for liability, they are to find the defendant liable. One might imagine counteracting the effects of hindsight bias by raising the evidentiary standard (as an alternative, not in addition, to the previous proposal; the two together would produce overcorrection and, thus, underdeterrence). Thus, for
example, if the jurors were to find the defendant liable only if the evidence
suggested at least a seventy-five percent likelihood—rather than merely a
fifty-one percent likelihood—that the critical harm probability threshold was
met, then they might well reach the correct conclusion about liability: They
would overestimate the likelihood attached to the critical threshold, but the
overestimate might well be below the new required level.

in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 485,
496 (1989).
166. Wexler & Schopp, supra note 165, at 494 (emphasis in original).
167. Arkes & Schipani, supra note 165, at 635.
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The highest evidentiary threshold known to our legal system—the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard—is used only in criminal cases. However, in civil cases an intermediate standard (higher than the preponderance
standard, but less demanding than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard)
is the “clear and convincing evidence” standard. This standard has been
adopted by many states for punitive-damage determinations,168 and a broadening of its use to all negligence determinations—or at least those in which
hindsight bias seems most likely to present a significant problem—might
provide a desirable counterweight to the tendency of jurors to overestimate
the probability that harm will occur. (Of course, further study would be required before reaching a final conclusion here.) This, of course, would be
likely to be a second-best solution; in some situations defendants might be
found not liable when, under a perfectly functioning system with no hindsight bias and no heightened evidentiary standard, they would be found liable.169 This need not be the case, however, and even if it is, we might well
tolerate a crude measure that produced some errors so long as it represented
an improvement over the current system. Most importantly, there is much
room for research focused on determining whether altering the evidentiary
threshold would represent a desirable response on balance—either across the
board or in particular categories of cases. Our goal is to suggest the value of
research on this issue, rather than to urge an immediate change in policy
based on what we now know.
To fix ideas for purposes of exploring these points, imagine first that
hindsight bias produces a similar increase across cases in a juror’s perceived
likelihood that the negligence threshold is met. (So, for example, suppose
that jurors generally overestimate by fifty percent the likelihood that the
negligence threshold is met, based on the evidence presented.) In this circumstance, the overestimation of the likelihood that the negligence threshold
is met could in theory be precisely offset by a change in the evidentiary
threshold. To see this point, imagine that the likelihood that the negligence
threshold has been met is graphed as a function of the strength of the evidence. In the absence of hindsight bias, the function will cross the fiftypercent (preponderance) cut-off at a given level of evidentiary strength, and
all cases in which the evidence is stronger than that should produce findings
of liability. But with hindsight bias, jurors will overestimate the likelihood
that the negligence threshold has been met, and this will produce an upward
shift in the function we are imagining; as a result, too many cases will cross
the preponderance line. But if that line itself is shifted up by an appropriate
amount, the hindsight-influenced function will cross it at precisely the same
level of evidentiary strength as the one at which the original function crossed
168. See Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1531 (1997).
169. See Rachlinski, supra note 158, at 606-07.
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the preponderance standard. For instance, if the likelihood that the negligence threshold has been met is a linear function of the strength of the evidence, half of all cases in the system meet the threshold under the preponderance standard, and jurors overestimate by fifty percent the likelihood that the
threshold is met, then a move to a seventy-five-percent likelihood requirement would result in the jurors’ finding negligence in precisely the half of
cases in which it should be found.
If hindsight bias produces different degrees of distortion in jurors’ probability estimates across different types of cases, then a shift to a higher evidentiary standard might result in underdeterrence of some defendants (specifically those whose actions will not be judged in a particularly hindsightbiased way). But as long as the increase in the evidentiary standard is modest relative to what hindsight bias in the average case warrants, the change
would produce fewer “underdeterrence errors” (findings of no liability for
defendants who should be found liable) than corrections of “overdeterrence
errors” (findings of liability for defendants who should not be found liable).
And the change from a move to the “clear and convincing evidence” standard would be a relatively modest one; a survey of federal district court
judges found that in the judges’ view that standard requires a likelihood of
sixty to seventy percent, compared to the fifty-one percent threshold under
the preponderance standard.170 (Of course, more interesting would be data
on how jurors view the two standards.)
One response to this analysis is that the reason jurors tend to find defendants liable even when liability is not legally warranted is not that jurors
overestimate the probability of harm, but simply that they want to compensate tort victims. Our first prescription addresses the latter issue as well as
the former, for if jurors do not know what harm occurred, it is difficult for
them to engage in compensation-based decisionmaking. (In the case of the
food-processing company discussed above, the jurors, to ensure compensation for the harm that occurred, would have to say that the company was
negligent whether it used the chemical or refrained from using it—probably
not a likely scenario.) But as far as the second prescription is concerned, the
problem of compensation-based decisionmaking remains. So if this is what
is going on, jurors may continue to find defendants liable, regardless of a
higher evidentiary threshold. But there is no reason to think the existence of
a higher threshold will make things worse in this situation, and so as long as
there are some cases in which jurors try faithfully to apply the negligence
standard, moving to the higher evidentiary threshold may improve decisionmaking. The same response may be offered to the objection that jurors’ behavior is not sensitive to the evidentiary threshold—a point on which there is

170. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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conflicting evidence;171 as long as an increase in the threshold will matter in
some cases, the change may be desirable, since there is no reason to think it
will cause harm in cases in which it does not change jurors’ behavior.
A final objection might be that altering the evidentiary standard would
not (it is claimed) survive the Kantian-Rawlsian publicity condition, which
means, roughly, that principles of justice must be defensible publicly, and
that their basis and content must not be secret.172 The question is whether it
is coherent to tell jurors that: Although this case should be decided by the
preponderance of the evidence, we know that you are likely to think irrationally, so therefore we raise the threshold to clear and convincing evidence.
We do not believe that there is anything incoherent, or violative of the publicity condition, in an idea of this sort. In both private and public life, people, acting individually or in groups, take steps to ensure against their own
tendencies to make mistakes. (We discussed in Part I.A the steps that people
frequently take to deal with problems of bounded willpower.) Raising the
standard of proof to prevent errors is consistent with much of the law of evidence, which is also designed to respond to cognitive errors. As just one example, consider the restrictions on admission of evidence of prior crimes.173
A public defense of such steps is perfectly intelligible.
3. Other applications.
The discussion to this point has focused on tort cases decided under the
negligence standard, but similar issues may arise in other areas of law in
which juries (or judges) must determine whether an ex ante standard was met
while armed with the knowledge that a negative event in fact materialized.
One example is securities fraud litigation, whose perceived excesses
prompted Congress to enact the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995.174 In a typical securities fraud case, decisionmakers are confronted
with a company whose stock price experienced a dramatic fall, and they are
required to assess whether a particular issue or problem facing the company,
whose disclosure prompted the fall, should have been disclosed at an earlier
stage (typically before it had become an issue or problem). Decisionmakers
in such a case are required to make an after-the-fact determination of
whether a reasonable ex ante decisionmaker would have thought the prospective issue or problem “material” to the average shareholder based on the
171. Compare Dorothy K. Kagahiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of
Standards of Proof, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 162-65 (1985) (finding no effect of different
evidentiary thresholds), with SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES 40 (6th ed. 1995) (citing studies that find such an effect).
172. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 (1971). This issue was raised by Jon Elster in
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
173. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
174. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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information available at the time.175 The problem is that this determination
must be made against the backdrop of knowledge that the issue or problem in
fact materialized, and produced a large drop in the company’s stock price. In
this situation, a decisionmaker will likely find it difficult to see how a reasonable ex ante decisionmaker might have thought the prospective issue or
problem other than material. Consistent with this analysis, the main predictor of whether a securities fraud action is brought seems to be whether there
has been a large change in the company’s stock market value, not whether
the company’s behavior was reasonable from an ex ante perspective.176
Another example here involves damage suits for violations of the Fourth
Amendment. A risk in such suits is that if the allegedly illegal search did in
fact produce damaging evidence (say, drugs or other contraband), then decisionmakers are likely to conclude that the law enforcement agency’s behavior was reasonable. This will be true even if, from an ex ante perspective
(without knowing the eventual outcome), this behavior would not have been
found reasonable.
B. Information Disclosure and Government Advertising
1. Background.
Suppose it is agreed that individuals lack adequate information on a
given subject—for example, workplace safety, appliance energy efficiency,
or the effects of drug use. In some such instances the government may seek
to foster comparison shopping and informed decisionmaking (as in the federal truth-in-lending law, which requires lenders to announce interest rates,
measured the same way177); in other instances the government may have a
specific policy goal (reducing drug use, encouraging the use of energyefficient refrigerators). Conventional economics acknowledges the possible
desirability of each of these goals (the second in the case of phenomena such
as externalities), and it often advocates, as a means of achieving them, providing additional information to citizens, either through a mandate to the
relevant private actors (for instance, employers), or through provision of information by the government itself.178
The prescription to “provide more information” is striking in its spareness. Behavioral analysis suggests that this prescription is far too spare.
175. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 8.10.4 (1986).
176. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 511-13 (1991); James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the
New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 93540, 979-80 (1996).
177. See Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-inLending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 223, 235-36 (1991).
178. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 90-91 (1986).
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“Provide more information” says nothing about the way in which the information will be provided, and yet we know from much of what has been said
already, as well as from empirical work by scholars such as W. Kip Viscusi,
that this will matter a great deal.179 Thus, for example, we know that people’s perceptions of the probability of uncertain events is influenced by the
salience of the presentation of these events.
That presentation matters has several implications. One is “antiprescriptive”: Prescriptions directed toward fostering comparison shopping—the
first government goal mentioned above—will often be incomplete and may
even be paralyzing, since there is often no “neutral” way to present information. The second implication is that effective prescriptive strategies for
achieving the second goal mentioned above—discouraging particular types
of behavior—must take behavioral factors into account. It is not enough
simply to “provide information.” We discuss several examples of this below.
2. Antiprescription.
Consider the following example of a government attempt to foster informed decisionmaking: In the case of defined contribution plans such as
401(k)s, the Labor Department, the relevant government authority, has ruled
that employers must give employees investment alternatives, and must provide information about those alternatives (such as risk and returns); but firms
are not allowed to offer “advice” as to how to invest.180 We think that such
spare guidelines place employers in a very difficult position. The reason is
that the way firms decide to describe and display information on investment
alternatives will have a powerful impact on the choices employees make.
Consider in this connection a recent study of the division of retirement
savings by university staff employees between two different funds, a safe
one (bonds) and a risky one (stocks).181 All the employees were shown actual historical data on the returns of the two funds, but this information was
displayed in two different ways; one group was given the distribution of oneyear rates of return, while the other was given a simulated distribution of
thirty-year rates of return. Those shown the thirty-year returns elected to
invest nearly all their savings in stocks, while those shown the one-year returns invested a majority of their funds in bonds. Our point is not that one of
179. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations
of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 630-36 (1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat & Joel
Huber, An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18
RAND J. ECON. 465, 477-78 (1987).
180. See Christine Williamson, Defined Contribution; DOL Moves Help Sponsors; But New
Proposals Raise Concerns at P&I Conference, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Feb. 5, 1996, at 27.
181. Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Risk Aversion or Myopia? Choices in Repeated
Gambles and Retirement Investments (Nov. 8, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Stanford Law Review).
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these outcomes is better. Our point is simply that in the real world, she who
provides information ends up giving advice.
This is an example in which the prescription to “provide more information” may be paralyzing; in other instances it may simply be incomplete.
Thus, suppose that the prescription is that certain private actors be required
to provide “information”; what does this mean? If it means that those who
expose people to a dangerous substance or product in the workplace (say
benzene) must provide them with accurate information about the danger, this
leaves open a tremendous range of possibilities. The actors subject to the
mandate will often have an interest in providing the least scary, most pallid
version of the information possible (for example, “benzene has been associated with a statistical increase in risk”), while regulators might want the most
scary, salient message available (say, “exposure to benzene will increase
your risk of getting CANCER and other FATAL diseases”). Of course, the
best message in this case, if the goal is accurate knowledge, may well be
somewhere in between. An important goal of the analyst’s task in making
prescriptions in this area is to say how the information should be provided—
not just that it should be provided.
In still other contexts, such as ones in which the presentation of information will affect people’s preferences rather than just their perceptions of risk,
it is not even clear in theory what is meant by ensuring “informed decisionmaking.” It is not even clear that there are steady or stable background preferences that might be “informed.” The preferences can themselves be an
artifact of the method of informing. For instance, one of the central features
of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory is that people evaluate outcomes based on the change they represent from an initial reference point,
rather than based on the nature of the outcome itself; also, losses from the
initial reference point are weighted much more heavily than gains.182 This
aspect of prospect theory (like its other features) is based on evidence about
actual choice behavior.183 The evaluation of outcomes in terms of gains and
182. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 12, at 277-79.
183. See id. at 273 (outcomes are viewed differently depending on whether they come in the
form of gains or losses from a perceived status quo); id. at 279 (citing Eugene Galanter & Patricia
Pliner, Cross-Modality Matching of Money Against Other Continua, in SENSATION AND
MEASUREMENT 65 (Howard R. Moskowitz, Bertram Scharf & Joseph C. Stevens eds., 1974))
(losses are weighted more heavily than gains). Another feature of how outcomes are viewed, both
empirically and under prospect theory, is that a given change produces less reaction the further a
decisionmaker is from her reference point. Thus, for example, the value difference between $10
and $20 is greater than the value difference between $1000 and $1010, both for gains and for losses,
assuming a reference point of $0. See id. at 278. In terms of the shape of the “value function” for
decisionmakers (a function giving the value of each outcome–this is prospect theory’s counterpart
to the utility function), this suggests a function that is concave for gains and convex for losses; only
with that shape are both gains and losses viewed as less significant the further the decisionmaker is
from her reference point. See id. This shape of the value function is further supported by evidence
of attitudes toward risk: People appear generally (though there are exceptions) to exhibit risk-
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losses from an initial reference point, coupled with the special aversion to
losses, means that it matters a great deal whether something is presented as a
gain or a loss relative to the status quo; a perceived threat of a loss relative to
the status quo weighs more heavily than a perceived threat of foregoing a
gain. In such cases it is difficult to say which individual is “informed”—the
one who is told of the perceived threat of a loss or the one who is told of the
perceived threat of foregoing a gain. In this and other contexts, preferences
are not preexisting but rather “constructive, context-dependent,” analogous
to the balls or strikes that do not predate the situation of choice and that
“ain’t nothing till” the umpire calls them.184
3. Prescriptions.
Suppose now that the agreed-upon goal is not to foster “informed decisionmaking,” but to discourage particular types of behavior. Conventional
economics would view this as a desirable goal at least to the extent that fullyinformed consumers would not engage in the behavior in question, and to an
even greater extent if the behavior in question produces externality effects.
And to achieve this goal, conventional economics would again prescribe, as
one possible means, “more information.” (Other, probably more usual,
means include taxation and regulation designed to discourage the unwanted
behavior.) Quite obviously, though, some ways of providing information are
more effective than others. There is nothing surprising about this statement.
Presumably, when firms pay millions of dollars to advertising agencies to
create splashy new ad campaigns, they think they are getting something for
their money. Likewise, there is of course an enormous marketing literature
about how best to shape people’s behavior in desired directions. These
points apply equally to the government. Below we develop briefly some
specific prescriptions for achieving goals that involve changing people’s behavior.
First prescription: Exploit loss aversion. As just noted, individuals tend
to weight losses far more heavily than gains. As a result, framing consequences in terms of losses rather than gains is likely to be far more effective
in changing behavior.185 A well-known illustration of this sort of framing
averse attitudes towards gains but risk-seeking attitudes toward losses, and these attitudes imply
concavity of the value function for gains and convexity for losses. See id. This pattern of concavity
and convexity has received considerable empirical support. See id. at 268, 278; Peter C. Fishburn
& Gary A. Kochenberger, Two-Piece Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Functions, 10 DECISION
SCI. 503, 509-10 (1979).
184. Amos Tversky & Richard H. Thaler, Preference Reversals, in THALER, supra note 40, at
79, 91.
185. Cf. Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing the Jury:
Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (finding effect
of gain versus loss framing on magnitude of damage awards).
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effect is a study involving breast self-examination; pamphlets describing the
positive effects of breast self-examination (for example, women who undertake such examinations have a greater chance of finding a tumor at a treatable stage) are ineffective, but there are significant changes in behavior from
pamphlets that stress the negative consequences of a refusal to undertake
self-examinations (women who fail to perform such examinations have a
decreased chance of finding a tumor at a treatable stage).186 Note that this
example illustrates how the provision of information may be a more natural
tool than taxation or regulation for discouraging some forms of behavior
(such as the failure to perform a self-examination).
Second prescription: Exploit salience. Effective prescriptive strategies
need to take account of the fact that vivid and personal information will often
be more effective than statistical evidence. This sort of information has a
high degree of salience, and, as a result of the availability heuristic, people
will tend to respond to it by attaching a higher probability to the event in
question. Thus an antidrug advertisement, showing a frying egg with the
announcer’s voice claiming, “this is your brain on drugs,” appeared to have a
significant effect on behavior.187 Availability suggests that the ad produced a
higher perceived probability of negative effects than a flatter ad would have.
Third prescription: Avoid the pitfalls of overoptimism. As noted in the
previous section, a common feature of human behavior is overoptimism.188
This behavior is not specific to the young, although it may be diminished as
people move beyond middle to old age, as Richard Posner has suggested.189
What does this feature of behavior imply about government provision of information? Consider the choice between a safe-driving campaign focused on
drivers’ own driving and the ingenuous campaign actually adopted by the
government: “Drive defensively: Watch out for the other guy.”190 The government’s campaign, perhaps self-consciously, responded to the fact that
most people tend to believe that they are unusually safe drivers. This is a
model of the sort of prescriptive approach advocated by behavioral analysis.

186. Beth E. Meyerowitz & Shelly Chaiken, The Effect of Message Framing on Breast SelfExamination: Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 500, 505
(1987).
187. See Douglas Herring, Comment, Getting High from South of the Border: Illicit Smuggling of Rohynol as an Example of the Need to Modify U.S. Response to International Drug Smuggling After NAFTA, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 841, 863 (1996) (citing Mathea Falco, Toward a More Effective Drug Policy, 1994 U CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 15).
188. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
189. See Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism, supra note 152 (overoptimism apparent in the
general public); RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 104-06 (1995).
190. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1177.
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C. Behavior of Criminals
1. Background.
Our discussion of prescriptive analysis has thus far focused on bounded
rationality. But bounded willpower may also play a role. Consider the
question of deterring criminal behavior. Economic analysis of this question
typically starts from the premise that potential offenders will be deterred
from criminal acts if the expected costs of those acts exceed their expected
benefits.191 Potential offenders are imagined to make at least a rough calculation of these costs and benefits in the process of making their decisions.
Bounded rationality suggests that people may make systematic (as opposed
to random) errors in computing these costs and benefits; for example, as described above, individuals tend to judge the likelihood of uncertain events
(such as getting caught for a crime) by how available such instances are to
the human mind, and this may depend on factors unrelated to the actual
probability of the event. This analysis suggests the desirability, from a prescriptive standpoint, of making law enforcement highly visible, holding constant the actual probability that offenders will be caught; it suggests, for example, the good sense of the familiar method of parking-ticket enforcement—sticking large, brightly-colored tickets that read “VIOLATION” in
large letters on the drivers’ side window, where they are particularly noticeable to drivers passing by—as opposed to a less costly approach (putting
small, plain tickets under the windshield wiper on the curb side of the street,
convenient for the parking officer to reach). Another example here is “community policing,” now widely practiced across the country; by making more
visible and memorable the presence of police (as, for example, by having
them walk their beats rather than ride in patrol cars), authorities can, it is
suggested, increase the deterrence of potential criminals without altering the
actual probability of apprehension.
But even if one assumes that potential offenders can accurately compute
the costs and benefits of crime, bounded willpower suggests that they will
often behave in ways at odds with conventional economic analysis, due to
problems of self-control. A central feature of much criminal behavior is that
the benefits are immediate, while the costs (if they are incurred at all) are
spread out over time—often a very long time. Economic analysis assumes
that such future costs are discounted to present value, and A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell have recently suggested that potential criminal offenders may have unusually high discount rates, so that years in prison far in

191. See Shavell, supra note 41, at 1235.
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the future will be discounted very heavily.192 Behavioral economic analysis
carries this idea further by incorporating self-control issues often emphasized
by criminologists.193
2. Prescriptions.
As just noted, the existing economic analysis assumes a constant discount rate (although perhaps a high one); this means that the difference between the attractiveness or aversiveness of a reward or punishment today
versus tomorrow is the same as the difference between a year from now and
a year and one day from now. In contrast to this theory, there is considerable
evidence that people display sharply declining discount rates.194 This means
that impatience is very strong for near rewards (and aversion very strong for
near punishments) but that each of these declines over time—a pattern referred to as “hyperbolic discounting.”195 Such attitudes reflect “dynamic inconsistency”; one’s present desires for the future are at odds with one’s future desires for the future.196 In an illuminating overstatement, Jon Elster has
referred to this as the “absolute priority of the present”—akin to the “absolute priority [of the self] over other persons: I am I—while they are all ‘out
there.’”197 Richard Posner has recently applied these ideas to issues of aging
and old age,198 and their application to criminal offenders is supported by the
idea that such offenders often behave “impulsive[ly]” and then have to “exaggerat[e] the benefits of crime” in order to justify their behavior to themselves later.199 Such a need for justification would not occur with the ordinary discounting assumed by most conventional economic analysis; decisions would not be regretted later because with that form of discounting there
is no dynamic inconsistency of preference.200
What does hyperbolic discounting imply for effective deterrence of
criminal behavior? With this sort of bounded willpower on the part of po192. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY & STEVEN SHAVELL, ON THE DISUTILITY AND DISCOUNTING
OF IMPRISONMENT AND THE THEORY OF DETERRENCE 12-13 (Harvard Law School, John M Olin
Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 213, 1997).
193. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF
CRIME 85-120 (1990) (emphasizing role of lack of self-control in criminal behavior); James Q.
Wilson & Allan Abrahamse, Does Crime Pay?, 9 JUST. Q. 359, 372-74 (1992) (similar).
194. See George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Intertemporal Choice, in THALER, supra
note 40, at 92, 95-96 (discussing studies).
195. See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 44546 (1997).
196. See id.
197. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY
71 (1979).
198. POSNER, supra note 189, at 84-94, 281-82.
199. Wilson & Abrahamse, supra note 193, at 374.
200. See Laibson, supra note 195, at 445.
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tential offenders, the difference between not getting caught and being imprisoned for, say, a year differs dramatically from the difference between
being imprisoned for ten years and being imprisoned for eleven years (even
apart from any fixed costs that may accompany the fact of conviction).
While the standard theory says that these two things differ only insofar as the
costs of imprisonment in year eleven must be discounted to present value in
order to be compared with the loss of wages and personal freedom in year
one, behavioral economic analysis (and basic common sense) tells us that
this is not so. Short punishments will thus have much more effect than long
punishments as a result of the “priority of the present”; adding years onto a
sentence will produce little additional deterrence.201 This idea is reflected in
policy recommendations such as Mark Kleiman’s “coerced abstinence” proposal, under which drug offenders on probation or parole would be swiftly
and automatically punished, but with modest sanctions, for any positive drug
result.202 Short punishments are also desirable under Polinsky and Shavell’s
approach, but for a different reason.
Our analysis is consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that criminal behavior is correlated with high levels of self-control problems. It appears, for example, that drunk-driving behavior is significantly correlated
with not wearing a seat belt—itself a behavior that seems to suggest a very
high weight on the present, and thus a lack of self-control in the sense used
here.203 Another interesting piece of empirical evidence concerns offenders’
views of sentences of different lengths. One study found that they view a
five-year term of imprisonment as, on average, only twice as bad as a oneyear term; the five-year term had a perceived severity of 200, compared to
100 for the one-year term.204 This alone is also consistent with a high discount rate—a rate of roughly 0.5. But with that discount rate, the difference
between a five- and ten-year term should be quite small (approximately 6 on
the severity measure); in fact, the difference was 300.205 This difference is
also somewhat higher than hyperbolic discounting would suggest; if the difference between 100 and 200 represents a .25 weight on all years after the
first year (so that the five-year term’s severity is 100 + 25 + 25 + 25 + 25 =
200), then the ten-year term’s severity would be 325—much closer than the
201. Cf. Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and Crimes: Towards an
Economic Theory of the Will, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 149, 154 (1991) (concluding that short but
highly probable sentences are optimal in a model in which potential offenders experience “lapses”
in self-control).
202. Mark A.R. Kleiman, Coerced Abstinence: A Neopaternalist Drug Policy Initiative, in
THE NEW PATERNALISM 182, 203, 205-08 (Lawrence M. Mead ed., 1997).
203. See Martin Friedland, Michael Trebilcock & Kent Roach, Regulating Traffic Safety, in
SECURING COMPLIANCE: SEVEN CASE STUDIES 165, 192 (1990).
204. William Spelman, The Severity of Intermediate Sanctions, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ.
107, 113 (1995).
205. Id.
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206 predicted by the nonhyperbolic approach, although still less than the actual severity rating of 500. These data are of course only suggestive; we
have not shown that the bounded willpower approach leads to improved predictions of actual criminal behavior. Empirical work on actual behavior of
this sort is notoriously difficult, but scholars such as Steven Levitt have begun to demonstrate the possibilities in this area.206 A full analysis of criminal
behavior would also need to incorporate other factors not considered here
(such as the role of community); our goal is only to sketch some of the many
ways in which conventional economic analysis of criminal law can be usefully extended using the tools of behavioral economics.
V. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS: ANTI-ANTIPATERNALISM
In its normative orientation, conventional law and economics is often
strongly antipaternalistic. The idea of “consumer sovereignty” plays a large
role; citizens, assuming they have reasonable access to relevant information,
are thought to be the best judges of what will promote their own welfare.
Yet many of the instances of bounded rationality discussed above call this
idea into question—and also, as we will emphasize below, call into question
the idea that intervention by government actors, who themselves may face
the same cognitive or motivational problems as everyone else, can improve
matters. In this way bounded rationality pushes toward a sort of antiantipaternalism—a skepticism about antipaternalism, but not an affirmative
defense of paternalism.207 We also note (although we do not explore this
point here) that while bounded rationality may increase the need for law (if
government’s failings are less serious than citizens’), bounded self-interest
may reduce it, by creating norms that solve collective action problems even
without government intervention.208
A. Citizen Error
Many of the forms of bounded rationality discussed above call into
question the idea of consumer sovereignty. For example, overoptimism
leads most people to believe that their own risk of a negative outcome is far
lower than the average person’s. Similarly, the effect of salience may lead to
substantial underestimation of certain risks encountered in everyday life (for
example, the risks from poor diet), since these harms may not be very salient.
206. Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police
on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270 (1997); Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size
on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 319 (1996).
207. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1178.
208. A standard argument for law under the conventional economic approach is that selfinterested people will create collective irrationality; if people are boundedly self-interested, however, this problem may tend to disappear.
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When overoptimism is combined with salience, people may underestimate
risks substantially. We emphasize that these problems are not ones of insufficient information per se; they are ones of insufficient ability to process accurately the information one possesses insofar as that information bears on
one’s own risks. Thus, for example, people may have reasonably adequate
information about the risks of smoking,209 but this does not at all imply that
they have adequate perceptions of the risks of smoking that they themselves
face.210 Even if people can obtain accurate statistical knowledge, statistical
knowledge may not be enough to inform actual choices.211 It does not follow
from this that information is useless; it is just that having information per se
does not automatically imply optimal behavior.
Further questions about the idea of consumer sovereignty arise from the
gap between “decision” and “experience” utility. The utility of actual experience may diverge from the anticipated utility as revealed by people’s decisions.212 The identity of decision and experience utility in conventional economics is often treated as an axiom, or at least as a proposition that could not
be falsified. But behavioral research shows that people’s judgments about
their future experience at the time of decision can be mistaken, in the sense
that people are sometimes unable (even apart from the sorts of informational
issues recognized by conventional economics) to assess what the experience
will actually be like. Thus, for example, people appear not to predict accurately the consequences of becoming seriously ill or disabled.213 They tend
to underestimate their ability to adapt to negative changes, a point that may
bear on law and policy in such areas as global climate change.214
But this suggestion about adaptation raises a complex normative question: Is a person’s measure of welfare after (for example) becoming ill the
appropriate measure of value? Perhaps people, through coping mechanisms,
are able to adapt to disease better than they anticipate in advance, but does
this mean that disease is a less severe problem than prior attitudes would
209. See W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING 4 (1992).
210. See Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming
1998).
211. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1184.
212. See Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, in THE
RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 203 (Kenneth J. Arrow, Enrico Colombatto,
Mark Perlman & Christian Schmidt eds., 1996).
213. See Philip Brickman, Dan Coates & Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative? 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978); George
Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in HEDONIC
PSYCHOLOGY: SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO ENJOYMENT, SUFFERING, AND WELL-BEING (Ed Diener, Norbert Schwartz & Daniel Kahneman eds., forthcoming 1998).
214. See George Loewenstein & Shane Frederick, Predicting Reactions to Environmental
Change, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
VALUATION AND DEGRADATION 52, 64-65 (Max H. Bazerman, David M. Messick, Ann E. Tenbrunsel & Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni eds., 1997).
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have suggested? On conventional utilitarian grounds, the answer is probably
affirmative; the subjective experience is what counts. But a well-established
challenge to utilitarian analysis suggests the possibility of a negative answer,
on the ground that subjective experience may not be all that counts.215 What
we mean to suggest here is a simple point: People sometimes do mispredict
their utility at the time of decision, and on conventional grounds, this phenomenon raises serious problems for the idea of consumer sovereignty.
B. Behavioral Bureaucrats
Any suggestion that the government should intervene in response to people’s mistakes raises the question whether the government will be able to
avoid such errors. The prospects for productive and useful intervention may
be smallest in the case of populist government; the actions of such a government, based heavily on pressures coming from citizens, may tend to be subject to the very same biases and errors that afflict citizens. (Thus behavioral
analysis complements existing accounts of the problems with populism.) An
example of the effects of populism is the Superfund statute, discussed in Part
III.C; irregular perceptions of risk by ordinary people may tend to produce
irregularities in regulation, as the cognitive errors that ordinary people make
are replicated in statutory and administrative law.216 The effects of social
interaction may even make government action worse, and more dangerous,
than individual errors. Our earlier discussion suggests a possible mechanism: Availability entrepreneurs in the private sector can heighten the demand for regulation, and public sector availability entrepreneurs can take
advantage of, and heighten, this effect, by advocating anecdote-driven policy. Thus public choice accounts of legislation can work productively with
behavioral accounts; there is a good deal of synergy between behavioral
mechanisms and interest group leaders, many of whom are amateur (or professional?) behavioral economists. The pollutant-of-the-month syndrome in
environmental law is paralleled by many measures responding to the crisisof-the-month. These difficulties with populist government also point to
problems with the referendum process.
But populist government is not the only worry. Government will often
be subject to cognitive and motivational problems even if it is not populist.
(Bureaucrats may also lack appropriate incentives to make decisions in the
public interest.217) Thus, for example, there is no necessary reason to think
215. See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983);
AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985).
216. See W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
RISK 149 (1992); VISCUSI, supra note 137, at 85-88, 94-97; Noll & Krier, supra note 137, at 76072.
217. See Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1719-20 (1989).
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that government officials are, by virtue of their offices, able to avoid overoptimism or predict experience utility. On the other hand, a degree of insulation from populist pressures, combined with knowledge of behavioral economics, might produce some improvement. New institutions may play a
role; consider Justice Breyer’s plea for an insulated body of specialized civil
servants, entrusted with the job of comparing risks and ensuring that resources are devoted to the most serious problems;218 Howard Margolis’ behaviorally-informed suggestion that government should be required to ensure
that all initiatives “do no harm”;219 even proposals for cost-benefit analysis,
understood in a behavioral light as an attempt to overcome biases and confusions in both perception and motivation.220 We also emphasize that government intervention need not come in highly coercive forms; perhaps distortions in people’s decisionmaking can be overcome by information campaigns
falling well short of coercion. For instance, in the contexts of risks such as
smoking, might debiasing techniques work to link the statistical evidence
with the personal reality?
All of the foregoing ideas raise many complexities; and we have not
even touched upon the complicated philosophical literature on the legitimacy
of paternalism. Application of these ideas to any specific topic in law would
require a much fuller development of many issues than the space in this article permits. But we need not leave the ideas in purely abstract form; consider the following simple illustration of their application. Imagine that
sunlamps are being sold in an unregulated market and that it is learned that
many consumers fall asleep under the lamps, burning themselves badly.
Consumers make this mistake in spite of warnings included on the package
and in the instructions, perhaps because they fail to anticipate that lying in a
warm place with one’s eyes closed is likely to induce sleep. Let’s call this an
“unintended risk,” meaning a risk that consumers fail to appreciate. The existence of this unintended risk leaves open the possibility of welfareenhancing regulation. Suppose, for example, that an automatic timer can be
added to the sunlamp at a cost of twenty-five cents, and that manufacturers
have not included this feature because consumers do not anticipate that they
will need it. We do not discuss here the issues raised by the possibility that a
government mandate of the timer interferes with freedom, rightly conceived.
Nor do we address possible distributive issues (all will pay more for sunlamps, although perhaps only some failed to appreciate the risks of falling
asleep). All we suggest is that an important part of the analysis involves
asking whether the cost of requiring this safety-promoting feature (twentyfive cents per customer) is less than the cost of the unanticipated burns.
218. BREYER, supra note 139, at 55-81.
219. HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK 165-89 (1996).
220. RISK VS. RISK (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995). Each of the solutions stated in the text may also be attractive to conventional economists on a variety of grounds.
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A central point of this example is that from the perspective of behavioral
law and economics, issues of paternalism are to a significant degree empirical questions, not questions to be answered on an a priori basis. No axiom
demonstrates that people make choices that serve their best interests; this is a
question to be answered based on evidence. Of course the case for intervention is weakened to the extent that public institutions are likely to make
things worse rather than better. What we are suggesting is that facts, and
assessment of costs and benefits, should replace assumptions that beg the
underlying questions.
CONCLUSION
Traditional law and economics is largely based on the standard assumptions of neoclassical economics. These assumptions are sometimes useful
but often false. People display bounded rationality: They suffer from certain
biases, such as overoptimism and self-serving conceptions of fairness; they
follow heuristics, such as availability, that lead to mistakes; and they behave
in accordance with prospect theory rather than expected utility theory. People also have bounded willpower; they can be tempted and are sometimes
myopic. They take steps to overcome these limitations. Finally, people are
(fortunately!) boundedly self-interested. They are concerned about the wellbeing of others, even strangers in some circumstances, and this concern and
their self-conception can lead them in the direction of cooperation at the expense of their material self-interest (and sometimes spite, also at the expense
of their material self-interest). Most of these bounds can be and have been
made part of formal models.
In this article we have sketched some of the implications of enriching the
traditional analysis by incorporating a more realistic conception of human
behavior. We have insisted on the value and importance of using the three
bounds in the economic analysis of law; more tentatively, we have explored
a series of legal problems in which the bounds may be significant. Obviously there is a great deal of research to be done, and one of our principal
goals has been to outline areas that could benefit from further work, both
analytic and empirical.
We do not doubt that replacing the simple maximizing model of economics with a more complicated psychological treatment comes at some
cost. Solving optimization problems is usually easier than describing actual
behavior. It has been said (we believe by Herbert Simon) that economics
makes things hard on agents, but easy on economists; behavioral economics,
we suggest, does the opposite. We recapitulate here some of the reasons we
think the enriched model is worth the trouble for those interested in the economic analysis of law.
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1. Some of the predictions of the standard model are simply wrong. For
example, people can be both more spiteful and more cooperative than
traditional analysis predicts, and this matters a great deal to law. It is
also important to know that even in a world without transaction costs and
wealth effects, the assignment of property rights alters the ultimate allocation of those rights, and that this may be particularly true for certain
forms of property-rights assignment (such as court orders). These features of the world matter greatly for making predictions and formulating
policy.
2. In other cases economics makes no predictions (or incorrect predictions
of no effect). Prominent in this category are the effects of presentation;
since economic theory assumes that choices are invariant to the manner
in which a problem is framed, it falsely predicts that the language of a
media account or advertisement has no effect on behavior, holding the
information content constant. In contrast, it is well established that people react differently to potential outcomes depending on whether they are
perceived as foregone gains or out-of-pocket costs (losses), and that they
are likely to think, mistakenly, that salient events are more common than
equally prevalent but more subtle ones. These points bear on the supply
of and the demand for law, and on the behavior of agents in their interactions with the legal system.
3. Standard economic theories of the content of law are based on an unduly
limited range of potential explanations, namely optimal (or second-best)
rules set by judges and rent-seeking legislation determined by selfinterested log-rolling. Behavioral economics offers other sources of potential explanation—most prominently, perceptions of fairness. We have
tried to show that many laws which are seemingly inefficient and do not
benefit powerful interest groups may be explained on grounds of judgments about right and wrong.
4. A behavioral approach to law and economics offers a host of novel prescriptions regarding how to make the legal system work better. Some
stem from the improved predictions mentioned in point 2 above. Cognitive difficulties and motivational distortions undermine or alter conventional economic prescriptions about the jury's role, most notably in the
context of assessing negligence and making other determinations of fact
or law. We have taken some preliminary steps in suggesting ways to reduce the costs of some of these problems.
5. A behavioral approach to law and economics produces new questions
about possible mistakes by private and public actors. On the one hand, it
raises serious doubts about the reflexive antipaternalism of some economic analysis of law. On the other hand, it raises equivalent questions
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about whether even well-motivated public officials will be able to offer
appropriate responses to private mistakes and confusion.
We hope that this article will encourage others to continue the inquiry
and research, both theoretical and empirical, that will be needed to flesh out
the behavioral approach for which we have argued here. This approach will
use traditional economic tools, enhanced by a better understanding of human
behavior. Thirty years from now, we hope that there will be no such thing as
behavioral economics. Instead we hope that economists and economically
oriented lawyers will simply incorporate the useful findings of other social
sciences, and in so doing, transform economics into behavioral economics,
and economic analysis of law into one of its most important branches.
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APPENDIX: FRAMEWORK AND SUMMARY OF APPLICATIONS
This appendix summarizes our framework for behavioral law and economics. It also lists the law and economics issues we analyze within each
category of the framework. The specific behavioral mechanisms we draw
upon, which are summarized here, do not constitute an exhaustive list of the
mechanisms that might be relevant to law and economics; they simply reflect
the mechanisms we have used here. For each mechanism, we provide a reference to the literature, as an overview of or entry to the existing research;
we refer the interested reader to the text of our article for additional references on each topic.
A. Bounded rationality
Judgment errors
1. self-serving bias
reference: Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining
Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 1997, at 109.
our applications: bargaining around court orders; failed negotiations.
2. availability heuristic
reference: Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 3 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
our applications: environmental legislation, government advertising, anti-antipaternalism.
3. hindsight bias
reference: Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect
of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE
288 (1975).
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our applications: negligence determinations; other determinations of fact or law.
4. omission bias
reference: Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 263 (1990).
our applications: negligence determinations; other determinations of fact or law.
5. overoptimism
reference: Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSCYHOL. 806
(1980).
our applications: government advertising, anti-antipaternalism.
6. inability to predict experience utility
reference: Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality
Assumption, in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOUR 203 (Kenneth J. Arrow, Enrico Colombatto, Mark
Perlman & Christian Schmidt eds., 1996).
our applications: anti-antipaternalism.
Decisionmaking behavior
1. loss aversion
reference: Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA
263 (1979).
our applications: government advertising.
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2. endowment effect (a corollary of loss aversion)
reference: Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H.
Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1327 (1990).
our applications: bargaining around court orders, mandatory
contract terms, prior restraints on speech.
B. Bounded willpower
1. “hyperbolic” discounting
reference: David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997).
our applications: criminal behavior.
C. Bounded self-interest
1. fairness behavior and spitefulness
reference: Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators, and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring
1995, at 209.
our applications: bargaining around court orders; bans on market transactions; prior restraints on speech.
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